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Our Constitution as Federal Treaty:
A New Theory of United States Constitutional
Construction Based on an Originalist
Understanding for Addressing a New World
by FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN*
This Article argues that the Constitution is a federal treaty based
on an originalist understanding. As a treaty, the Constitution must be
construed in conformity with the United States' customary international
legal obligations, according to the international law governing treaties.
Furthermore, these customary international legal norms often will take
primacy over the major general principles of constitutional
construction (viz., the principles of federalism, separation of powers,
and the "living Constitution") because these international legal norms
often are more determinate and less judicially-constructed than general
principles of constitutional construction yet these norms can still
accommodate these general principles. Furthermore, unlike other
theories of constitutional interpretation, this approach provides a
mandatory theory of constitutional construction that is deduced from
the Constitution's "text" - in both senses of "language" and "legal
instrument." This theory of constitutional construction will be called
"International Legal Constructionism." By construing the Constitution
in accordance with customary international law, the Constitution can
meet the challenges of globalization and secure fundamental rights for
the American people.
President, Rights International, The Center for International Human Rights Law,
Inc.; fmr. Ariel F. Sallows Professor of Human Rights, University of Saskatchewan College
of Law. The author wishes to thank Mark Tushnet and David Sloss for their very helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Portions of this Article were delivered at the Federalist
Society's Fifth Annual Faculty Division Conference in Washington, D.C. (2003) and at the
ACLU's Human Rights at Home Conference in Atlanta (2003).
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Introduction
In the face of growing globalization, can our Constitution
adequately address the forces of globalization that have been created
by a host of recent technological and geopolitical developments? The
effective erosion of national frontiers, the increasing interdependence
of states, and the multiplication of multilateral approaches to global
problems demand a construction of the Constitution that can respond
to these new challenges - this New World. Our Constitution should
be up to the task. After all, it originally was designed for a New
World, albeit an earlier and somewhat different one.
Fortunately, the Constitution often is cast in general language
that allows adaptability to new circumstances.1 However, such
general language requires further definition, and properly construing
the Constitution is of paramount importance for ensuring the
Constitution's vitality when confronted with novel situations. In our
present New World, construing the Constitution in conformity with
international law would appear to enable the Constitution to meet the
test of globalization because international law generally provides a
uniformity of norms across frontiers.2 Also, because it has embedded
values common to the global community, international law enables
multilateral, integrated approaches to conflicts, catastrophes, and
other challenges. However, most constitutional construction by the
courts has been textually and nationally insular. Such a hermeneutic
1. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816) ("constitution
unavoidably deals in general language" in order to adapt to new circumstances).
2. In the field of international human rights law, this uniformity is unremarkable
because different treaties contain similar if not identical language and because
international law must be construed in conformity with other international law. Compare,
e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPRI, with the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Feb. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR], and the American Convention on
Human Rights, Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered
into force July 17, 1978) [hereinafter ACHR]; see also Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (Advisory Opinion, June 22,
1971) ("international instrument was to be interpreted and applied within the framework
of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation").
There are only a very few areas in which international human rights norms arguably
conflict. Contrast, e.g., Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, Application No.
52207/99 (2001) (refusing to recognize extraterritorial application of the right to life), with
Alejandre et al. v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.L/VII.106 Doc. 3 rev.
at 586 (1999) (recognizing extraterritorial application of right to life); Saldfas de L6pez v.
Uruguay, Comm. No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985) (views adopted July 29,
1981) (same).
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approach has hermetically sealed the Constitution from international
law and mystified the Constitution's meaning.
To meet the challenges of this New World, I will propose a new
paradigm of constitutional construction based on an originalist
understanding of the Constitution.3 This Article will argue that the
Constitution is a federal treaty.4 As a treaty, the Constitution must5
be construed in conformity with the United States law of nations6
3. By "an originalist understanding," I mean the public understanding of the
Constitution's meaning around the time of its ratification as garnered from, e.g., the
proceedings of the Continental Congress, Constitutional Convention, and state
constitutional conventions; writings by the Founding Fathers (including the Federalist and
Anti-Federalist Papers); speeches, resolutions, and laws from the early Congress;
statements by the early Executive Branch; and early judicial opinions. See KEITH
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001) (discussing originalist theories). However, it is
important to note that this Article departs from originalism when it fails to accept the
Constitution's status as a treaty and its consequent legal implications as a treaty.
4. During the Constitution's framing and ratification period, it was not controversial
that the Constitution was a treaty. Only later during the 19" century nullification debate
did a controversy emerge over whether the Constitution was a treaty. See infra Part 1.3.
There are writings among early nineteenth century states' rights advocates and a modern
foreign international jurist explicitly arguing that the Constitution was a "treaty." See, e.g.,
Congressional Resolution introduced by Pennsylvania (11 Jan. 1811) (drafted by Roane)
(declaring Constitution "to all intents and purposes" was "a treaty among sovereign
states"), in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 150 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969); Torkel Opsahl, An "International Constitutional Law"? 10 INT'L. &
COMP. L.Q. 760, 771 (1961) (Constitution was a treaty). However, there appears to be no
literature explicitly referring to the Constitution as a "federal treaty." Furthermore, the
writings of these early states rights advocates reflect incorrect conceptions of both the
Constitution and the international law governing treaties. Most recently, a political
scientist has argued that in view of the political circumstances facing the Founders, the
Constitution could be viewed as a treaty-like arrangement. See DAVID C. HENDRICKSON,
PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2003).
5. There is no academic literature arguing for a mandatory construction of the
Constitution's text according to the law of nations. The literature only argues that the
Constitution should be construed in conformity with customary international law. See infra
note 9. However, as discussed below, Randolph, Madison, and others during the Virginia
Constitutional Convention argued that the Constitution was to be construed in conformity
with the law of nations. See infra text accompanying note 74 and Part 1.2.1.
6. As a preface, I should make clear that when I use the phrase "law of nations," I
am referring mainly to* those international legal norms that the United States itself has
explicitly or effectively recognized as binding through the Article II treaty ratification
process and/or the Article I "define and punish" legislative process for international law
that is constituted primarily by treaty and customary international law. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2 (President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur"); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power... to define and punish... Offenses
against the Law of Nations"); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116 (1812) (United States recognition of law of nations norm necessary for norm to be
binding on United States); see The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (state
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obligations - specifically those constituting customary international
law.7 I will call this new theory "International Legal Constructionism
acceptance of law of nations norm required for state to be bound by it). The above
emphasis of "and/or" is meant to point out that customary international legal norms can
become binding on the United States through both the Constitution's Article I customary
international legal defining process and Article II treaty ratification process - especially
for multilateral treaties that often codify customary international law.
When the United States ratifies a multilateral treaty, such a treaty often is clarifying
extant or emerging customary international legal norms through their codification in a
treaty. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROSPECT AND PROCESS 123-
47 (1987); CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCE AND EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-67
(1965); Richard R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1965-66). If the multilateral treaty is clarifying emerging
customary international legal norms, the United States' signature to the treaty also signals
its acceptance of these norms - unless the United States objected to the norm during the
treaty's drafting. A state that clearly and expressly objects to a customary international
law norm during the norm's emergence is not bound by the norm. This rule is known as
the "persistent objector rule." See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131
(Dec. 18, 1951) (recognizing persistent objector rule); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt b (1987) (recognizing
persistent objector rule) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW
OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGN, Preliminaries § 26 (1758) (Joseph Chitty ed.,
1883) (state must expressly object to customary international legal norm to not be bound
by it) [hereinafter, VATrEL]; but see Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87
AM. J. INT'L .L. 529, 540 (1993) ("state practice and other evidence do not support the
existence of the persistent objector rule"). However, if the United States signs or ratifies
the treaty without a reservation to the norm, the United States' signature/ratification
signals its acceptance of the norm as a customary international legal norm (assuming a
sufficient number of states also have accepted the. norm through signature, accession, or
ratification without objection to the norm). United States v. Smith, 5 U.S. (Wheat.) 153,
159 (1820) ("common consent of nations" to public code as establishing law of nations). If
a state merely signs - but does not ratify - the treaty reflecting emerging customary
international legal norms, the state still has signaled its acceptance of the emerging
customary international legal norms because signatory states may not defeat the object
and purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) ("A State is obliged to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) It has signed the
treaty... until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty .. ") [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Of course, once a state has signed a treaty
reflecting customary international legal norms, it cannot withdraw its acceptance of these
customary international legal norms because it has bound itself to other states vis-a-vis
these norms. Only another widely adopted multilateral treaty between the same states-
parties can void the earlier customary international law norms reflected in the earlier
treaty.
7. Customary international law constitutes a substantial part of the "law of nations,"
the phrase used by the Constitution. Evidence of a norm having customary international
legal status can be found in treaties, the customs and usages of nations. Commonwealth v.
Kosloff, 5 Serg. & Rawle 545 (Pa. 1816). Modern customary international law is primarily
made by the political branches through the treaty process. However, before the adoption
of hundreds of multilateral treaties codifying customary international law in the twentieth
century, the law of nations primarily was "ascertained by consulting the works of jurists,
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[ILC]."
Although the Supreme Court has held that Congress is assumed
to legislate in conformity with its international legal obligations and
that ambiguous federal statutes must be construed in conformity with
such obligations,8 few jurists have argued that the Constitution should
be construed in conformity with the law of nations,' and the United
States Supreme Court also has cited international legal authorities in
construing the Constitution. °  Even fewer have argued that the
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by
judicial decisions recognising (sic.) and enforcing that law." United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820). Accordingly, this Article mostly will cite the works of pre-
19th century international jurists (such as Grotius, Vattel, Burlamaqui, Wolff, Wilson, and
Pufendorf), and 18 h and 19th century treaties and case law for evidence of the law of
nations as it existed at the time of the United States Constitution's framing. For modern
statements of the law of nations, this Article mostly will cite widely adopted multilateral
treaties and judicial decisions.
8. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64, 118 (1804) (this rule
of construction is known as the "Charming Betsy Rule").
9. See, e.g., FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, CHALLENGING HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS: USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS 134 (2001) [hereinafter
MARTIN, CHALLENGING]; Gordon Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due
Process and Equal Protection Analysis, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1983); Joan Fitzpatrick, The
Significance of Customary International Human Rights Law: The Relevance of Customary
International Norms to the Death Penalty in the United States, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
165, 179-80 (1995-96); Joan F. Hartman, Unusual Punishment: The Domestic Effect of
International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV.
655 (1983); Ann I. Park, Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International
Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195
(1987); Andrew L. Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered: The Jurisdictional Nihilism of
the Supreme Court's Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1209,
1236 n.72 (1994); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of
Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1990); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 244 (1996) (arguing that
Constitution's war declaration clause should be interpreted consistently with international
law because "[t]he Framers turned to international law to define [such] phrases"); Harry
A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 45 (1994)
("International law can and should inform the interpretation of various clauses of the
Constitution, notably the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments.").
10. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing European Court of
Human Rights case law); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (citing International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination for construing 14 h Amendment's equal protection guarantee in support of
affirmative action program); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, n.21 (2002) (citing amicus
brief from European Union in McCarver v. North Carolina); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, n.34 (1988) (citing ICCPR for construing 8h Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment in prohibiting execution of persons under the age of 16
committing capital crimes); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n.16 (1963)
(citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights for construing 5"! and 6"h Amendment in
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Constitution must be construed in conformity with the law of
nations." None have provided a justification based on the
Constitution's text for why the Constitution must be construed in
conformity with the law of nations.
ILC has the advantage of providing a unique prescriptive
methodology of constitutional construction that is derived inherently
from the kind of legal instrument that the Constitution is (viz., a
federal treaty) and in whose text the Constitution is indicated as
such.' ILC is truly "textualist" in both senses of the word. First, ILC
is textualist in that it relies upon what the Constitution's text
expressly states. Second, ILC is textualist in that it relies on what the
Constitution as a text is.
It is this last sense of "textualist" that provides the prescriptive
nexus between the Constitution and the use of extra-constitutional
authorities for construing it that often is lacking in other theories of
constitutional construction. When some theories do address the issue
of what the Constitution is, such theories cannot show where in the
Constitution's text that the Constitution says it is such. For example,
Judge Bork (a textualist) has referred to the Constitution as a "social
compact," but the Constitution never refers to itself as such.13 Of
course, theories based on the "living Constitution" principle do rely
upon the Constitution's text denoting it as a constitution," but such
theories merely beg the question because such theories merely point
out that the Constitution qua constitution must be construed in a
fashion that constitutes the government of the United States. 1" Such
theories cannot show how the use of particular extra-constitutional
authorities are required by the nature of the Constitution as a
constitution and cannot show any text in the Constitution requiring
the use of such authorities.
Clearly, the Constitution's text is often ambiguous requiring -
practically speaking - the use of extra-constitutional sources for its
construction. 6 Constitutional jurists-must construe the Constitution
citizenship revocation case).
11. See infra discussion accompanying note 74 (statement by Randolph and Lobel
article).
12. See U.S. CONST. art. VII ("Constitution between the States").
13. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDuCrION OF THE LAW 19 (1991).
14. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (denoting Constitution as constitution).
15. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("we must
never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.") (emphasis removed).
16. Such extra-constitutional sources constitute a potentially enormous corpus,
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not only from the inside out, but also from the outside in. We have to
do so because the Constitution per se does not provide any explicit
comprehensive or coherent methodology of interpretation or
construction. The Constitution does not even say that its terms must
be construed in accordance with its other terms or its structure - a
traditional textualist approach. With three exceptions, the
Constitution never addresses how it must be interpreted or construed.
However, the first two exceptions are nearly empty of content.
Article IV only says that "nothing in this Constitution shall be so
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
particular State."' 7  The Ninth Amendment only says that "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."'8 On
the other hand, the third exception, the Seventeenth Amendment,
does have content, but its content has few applications: "This
amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term
of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the
Constitution." 9
How does a jurist successfully argue that the use of certain extra-
constitutional authorities are mandatory for construing the
Constitution when the Constitution does not explicitly require that it
must be construed in conformity with them? As demonstrated below,
the answer is that one needs to recognize the Constitution is a treaty
constituting a nation, and as such a treaty by definition and law, it
must be construed in conformity with the law of nations.
Accordingly, this Article will argue that construing the
Constitution in conformity with the law of nations takes primacy over
other general principles (and their elaborative theories) of
constitutional construction because ILC (unlike these other principles
and theories) provides a justification of its prescriptive methodology
of constitutional construction that is intrinsically linked to the
Constitution's language and - most importantly - the Constitution as
a treaty. ILC also acquires primacy over these other principles or
including, e.g., the Declaration of Independence; Articles of Confederation; the
proceedings of the Continental Congress, Constitutional Convention, and state
constitutional conventions; writings by the Founding Fathers (including the Federalist and
Anti-Federalist Papers); Congressional speeches, resolutions, and laws; Executive Branch
statements and orders; federal and state judicial opinions; history; and social science
theories.
17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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theories because it requires the use of the enormous corpus of
specific, contemporary, conventional customary international law that
often not only accommodates these principles but also often defines
these plastic principles and ensures greater political accountability. °
As illustrations of ILC's advantages, this Article will examine the
three major, general principles of constitutional construction: the
principles of federalism, separation of powers, and a "living
Constitution."
Through the ILC approach, we also will be able to do an "end-
run" around some recent arguments against the enforceability of
customary international law and treaties as well as address
problematic issues concerning the substantive content of the Ninth
Amendment and the proper reach of the State Commerce Clause that
results from the use of these principles of traditional constitutional
21construction.
1. The Formation of the United States and Eventual
Establishment of the Constitution within the Context of an
International Legal Process
To properly understand the formation of the United States and
the eventual establishment of the Constitution, it is necessary to place
them in the context of an international legal process that began with
the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Independence
(1776), Articles of Confederation (1778), and the Constitution (1788)
are three different kinds of international legal instruments building
upon the previous one in order to ensure the political and legal
viability of the United States.
20. I use the word "primacy" to indicate only that ILC has prescriptive priority over
other principles and theories because of ILC's incorporation of the Constitution as a
treaty concept unlike these other principles and theories. Nevertheless, these other
principles and theories are often very helpful and even necessary for socially responsible
constitutional construction - especially when customary international law does not provide
material for construing the Constitution.
21. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997)
[hereinafter, Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Common Law] (customary international law is
unenforceable in United States courts); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:
Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955
(1999) [hereinafter, Yoo, Globalism]; John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A
Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999)
[hereinafter Yoo, Rejoinder] (treaties are unenforceable in United States courts without
implementing legislation or without express declaration of enforceability made by
President or Senate).
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1.1 The Declaration of Independence and Articles of Confederation
The Declaration of Independence was an international
declaration to other nation-states setting forth the thirteen colonies'
complaints against the British Crown justifying their independence
under international law, announcing their independence from Great
Britain, and declaring their rights under international law "to levy
War, conclude Peace, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts
and Things which Independent States of right may do."22  The
Declaration of Independence complained of the British Crown's
violation of colonists' rights even though in reality it was Parliament
that had violated the colonists' rights.23 Of course, given that the
Declaration was an international legal instrument, it was appropriate
that the complaints were attributed to the British Crown as head of
state - the proper addressee for international legal matters - and not
Parliament, which merely is the government. As a practical matter, an
international declaration was needed in order that the thirteen
colonies could be recognized as states by other foreign states. Under
the law of nations, members of a state could dissolve their relations
with their prince if the prince failed to protect them, and establish an
independent state:
The state is obliged to defend and preserve all its members...
and the prince owes the same assistance to his subjects. If,
therefore, the state or the prince refuses or neglects to succour a
body of people who are exposed to imminent danger, the latter,
being thus abandoned, become perfectly free to provide for
their own safety and preservation in whatever manner they find
most convenient, without paying the least regard to those who,
by abandoning them, have been the first to fail in their duty.
The country of Zug, being attacked by the Swiss in 1352, sent
for succour to the duke of Austria, its sovereign; but that prince,
being engaged in discourse concerning his hawks, at the time
when the deputies appeared before him, would scarcely
condescend to hear them. Thus abandoned, the people of Zug
entered into the Helvetic confederacy.24
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 5-32 (complaints against Crown),
34 (rights of independent states) (U.S. 1776); see David Armitage, The Declaration of
Independence and International Law, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 1, 39 (2002) (Declaration of
Independence recognized as international instrument in 18" century).
23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 ("The history of the present
King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.").
24. 1 VATrEL, supra note 6, § 202.
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The British Crown repeatedly had failed to protect the colonies
in a number of different ways; therefore, under the law of nations, the
thirteen colonies could declare their-independence and establish a
confederacy. Indeed, a primary purpose of the Declaration was to
seek alliances through treaties with other states, such as France, in
order to fight the British in securing the colonies' independence, and
this purpose could only be accomplished if other nation-states
recognized the United States.25 The Declaration of Independence
served to give notice to other foreign states that the thirteen colonies
were now independent states and provided the reasons for their
independence.
Subsequently, the Articles of Confederation were adopted
establishing a government. The Articles of Confederation was a
regional, multilateral, federal, constitutional treaty between the
thirteen - now sovereign - states.26 It was a "regional" treaty in that it
25. See, e.g., Treaty of Alliance, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 2 T.I.A.S. No. 35; Treaty of
Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, U.S.-Neth., 2 T.I.A.S. No. 59; Treaty of Amity and
Commerce, Apr. 3, 1783, U.S.-Swed., T.I.A.S. No. 123; Treaty of Amity and Commerce,
July 9, 1785, U.S.-Fr., 8 Bevans 78.
26. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Supreme Court appeared to
suggest that the thirteen independent states were not individually sovereign:
By the Declaration of Independence, "the Representatives of the United States
of America" declared the United [not the several] Colonies to be free and
independent states ... . As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the
colonies acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and
corporate capacity as the United States of America .... When, therefore, the
external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it
immediately passed to the Union.
299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936). However, the Court restricts its discussion to "external
sovereignty" with foreign states. The individual states retained their "internal
sovereignty" under the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 187 (1824) (states sovereign and "completely
independent" under Articles). This retention of sovereignty in federal republics was
consistent with the law of nations. As Vattel stated:
several sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together by a
perpetual confederacy, without ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect state.
They will together constitute a federal republic: their joint deliberations will not
impair the sovereignty of each member, though they may, in certain respects, put
some restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements.
1 VATTEL, supra note 6, § 10. Therefore, the Declaration and Articles of Confederation
still were international legal instruments - but internationally restricted mostly to relations
between the states of the Union that remained "internally sovereign" within that Union.
The individual internal sovereignty of the states was maintained respectively through the
Articles as a con-federal treaty and later the Constitution as a federal treaty. Even if this
external sovereignty .was passed from the Crown to the collective and corporate capacity
of the United States, states still retained some external sovereignty with regard to foreign
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bound states in the North American region as well as invited Canada
to become a member. It was a multilateral, federal, constitutional
treaty in that it bound thirteen sovereign states into a confederacy
and constituted a federal government. For example, the Articles
Congress referred to the Articles as a "national constitution, '"28 and
the Commissioners at the Annapolis Convention and Madison in The
Federalist No. 40 both referred to the Articles as a "constitution of
the federal government."29 And, like other similar multilateral
treaties, it established a league of friendship, trade, and mutual
defense.0 The thirteen states were just the same as other foreign
states, but they had placed themselves into a federal arrangement.
However, the Articles were less than perfect in ensuring that the
thirteen states acted uniformly in their international relations
between themselves and foreign states, not doubt in part because the
Confederation was a diplomatic body, according to John Adams3 and
because states (with three exceptions32) failed to employ the boards of
commissioners or federal courts provided by the Articles of
Confederation for resolving inter-state disputes.33 States enacted
trade barriers and entered into treaties with each other, and violated
states. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ci. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress,... enter into any Agreement or Compact... with a foreign Power....").
States subsequently have entered into agreements with foreign states. See, e.g., Public Law
85-145 (Joint Resolution consenting to agreement between New York and Canada
providing for continued existence of Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority), 71
Stat. 367 (1957).
27. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI (U.S. 1781) (inviting Canada to
become member) [hereinafter ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION].
28. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 177 (1912) (letter to Great
Britain dated Apr. 13, 1787).
29. Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government,
Annapolis in the State of Maryland (Sept. 14, 1786) at para. 11; THE FEDERALIST No. 40,
at para. 3 (James Madison) (1788) (citing same language).
30. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. III ("states hereby severally enter into a firm
league of friendship").
31. 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 505 (photo. Reprint 1971) (1787).
32. Connecticut v. Pennsylvania, 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 6-
32 (1912) (1783 dispute over Wyoming Valley adjudicated by federal court established
under the Articles); Massachusetts v. New York, 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 617-29 (territorial dispute adjudicated by federal court established under the
Articles and subsequently settled); Georgia v. South Carolina, 31 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 651 (congressional resolution approving establishment of
federal court for resolving territorial dispute).
33. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (providing for court and boards of
commissioners for resolving inter-state conflicts).
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treaties with Great Britain, France and Holland. 3'
1.2 The Constitution as Federal Treaty
As a result of these problems, the people of the United States "in
Order to form a more perfect Union" replaced the Articles with
another regional, multilateral, federal, constitutional treaty - viz., the
Constitution. Whereas the individual states of the United States were
to remain intact, the government under the Articles was replaced with
a different government under the Constitution. The legal status of
the thirteen states under the Articles of Confederation as states did
not change under the Constitution. They were still sovereign states
with international legal personalities. As under the Articles,35 states
still could enter into agreements with foreign -states and each other
with Congressional approval under the Constitution. 6 Only the legal
relations between the states, and between the states and federal
government were altered through the adoption of the Supremacy
Clause that ensured the supremacy of federal law (which included
treaties) over state law.37 The compulsory original jurisdiction of the
34. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 348-57 (William T. Hutchinson, et al., eds., 1962-77)
[hereinafter Madison, Vices].
35. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI ("No State, without the consent of the
United States in Congress assembled, shall.., enter into any conference, agreement,
alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or State .... No two or more States shall enter
into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of
the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the
same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.").
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation .... ") and 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ... enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power .... ).
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Law of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
It is interesting to note that the Supremacy Clause ensures that state judges can apply
treaties and federal law as the supreme law of the land. This was to ensure that state
courts had lawful jurisdiction to apply federal law that, otherwise, they could not apply.
Recall that although British courts could apply customary international law, they could
not apply treaties without implementing legislation from Parliament. See 3 VATrEL, supra
note 6, n. (172) ( "And in Great Britain, no municipal court, whether of common law or
equity, can take cognizance of... any question respecting the infraction of treaties be
directly agitated before courts of law .... (Ed.'s note)). To avoid this scenario, the
Supremacy Clause guaranteed that state courts could directly apply treaties and federal
statutory law (a species of international law). See infra discussion accompanying note 208
(federal statutory law as international law). Furthermore, state courts-like the British
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United States Supreme Court ensured that inter-state conflicts and
treaty violations were to be resolved and not allowed to fester, as they
had under the Articles.38 Only the constitutional law compliance
mechanism had been altered for the states - not the states themselves.
Again, like under the Articles of Confederation, the states were the
same as foreign states, but they had placed themselves in a federal
arrangement. If the Framers had wanted to make the thirteen states
not "states" in the international legal sense, they would have done so
by calling the states something else. They did not.
For the Framers, using a treaty was the proper vehicle for joining
the thirteen states into the United States and the peoples therein as
one nation because it was the customary legal instrument for uniting
states and consolidating peoples.39 Of course, the United States
Constitution was not the first treaty establishing a constitution.
Earlier examples included the Articles. of Confederation and the
Union of Utrecht (1579). As one Anti-Federalist put it, "Who is it
that does not know, that by treaties in Europe the succession and
courts-already could apply customary international law. See, e.g., Respublica v. De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 114 (Pa. Oyer and Terminer, 1784); Nathan v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77, 78 (Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
1781). VATTEL, supra note 6, Preliminaries, n. (1) ("The law of nations is adopted in Great
Britain in its full and most liberal extent by the common law, and is held to be part of the
law of the land; and all statutes relating to foreign affairs should be framed with reference
to that rule. (Ed.'s note, citing 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 67.)) Hence, there was no need to include the customary law of nations in the
Supremacy Clause.
38. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction.")
39. The Declaration of Independence earlier also stated that the people of the
different colonies were one people. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 6 ("We...
the Representatives of the united States of America... do, in the Name, and by Authority
of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United
Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States .... ").
It is important to note the difference between "nations" and "states." Nations are
peoples. States are bodies politic. When a nation and state are joined, they constitute a
"nation-state." The American people were the people in the United States under both the
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. Sometimes nations are not organized into
states (as is the case of the Kurdish people in Turkey and Iraq). Also, a state may include
multiple nations. For example, Florida includes both the American and Seminole nations.
There also is a difference between states and governments. The government of a
state can change without eliminating the state. For example, the recent change of
government in Iraq did not eliminate the state of Iraq. The United States were not
eliminated when the government under the Articles of Confederation was replaced with
the Constitution's government.
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constitution of many sovereign states, ha[ve] been regulated? 4 0 In
arguing for the adoption of the Constitution, Jay made a favorable
comparison of the consolidation of the American people under the
Constitution with the consolidation of the British people by implicit
reference to the Treaty of Union (1707) between England and
Scotland. 4' Like the Treaty of Union, the Constitution as a treaty
operated to unify states and consolidate peoples. As James Madison
in 1833 pointed out in his letter to Daniel Webster, the states were
"parties" to the Constitution, and the Constitution made the
American people "one people, [i.e.,] nation.
4 2
However, Madison made two statements during his life
appearing to suggest that the Constitution was not a treaty. During
the Constitutional Convention, he is reported to have stated that
"[h]e considered the difference between a system founded on the
Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the true
difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution.'4 3 Later in
his 1833 letter to Daniel Webster, he also stated the following:
It is fortunate when disputed theories, can be decided by
undisputed facts. And here the undisputed fact is, that the
Constitution was made by the people, but as imbodied into the
several states, who were parties to it and therefore made by the
States in their highest authoritative capacity. They [i.e., the
states] might,.by the same authority & by the same process have
converted the Confederacy into a mere league or treaty; or
continued it with enlarged or abridged powers; or have
imbodied the people of their respective States into one people,
nation or sovereignty; or as they did by a mixed form make
them one people, nation, or sovereignty, for certain purposes,
and not so for others."
It is important to note in the above two excerpts that Madison is
not saying that the Constitution is not a "treaty" in its sense of being a
legal instrument. Madison was using the term "treaty" to refer to the
40. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST No. 75, at para. 2 (Hampden) (1788).
41. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, at para. 3 etpassim (John Jay) (1787).
42. James Madison to Daniel Webster (15 Mar. 1833), in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, ch. 3, doc. 14 (Gaillard Hunt ed.), available at http://press-
pubs.uchichago.edu/founders/documents/vlch3sl4.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
43. JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF 1787 (July 23,1787).
44. James Madison to Daniel Webster (15 Mar. 1833), in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, ch. 3, doc. 14 (Gaillard Hunt ed.), available at http://press-
pubs.uchichago.edu/founders/documents/vlch3sl4.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
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political system of a league or alliance or confederacy 4-another,
somewhat arcane, meaning of the word "treaty.
4 6
Indeed, there appears to be no evidence during the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution that the Founders thought that the
Constitution was not a treaty. The Founders operated under the
assumption that the Constitution was a treaty. The issue was non-
controversial. 7
1.2.1. The Dissolution of the Articles of Confederation and Ratification of
the Constitution Governed by the Law of Treaties
Furthermore, the only legal instrument that could have dissolved
the Articles of Confederation was another treaty because only a
45. Appearing to rely on Madison's above statements, both early and contemporary
writers often incorrectly state that the Constitution was not a treaty in the sense of being a
legal instrument. They fail to recognize that Madison was referring to the government
created by the Constitution - not the Constitution itself-and that his use of "treaty"
meant the political organization of a "league." See, e.g., David Golove, The New
Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1714 (2003) ("the proposed Constitution crossed the line that
separates a league or treaty"); John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, In Defense VII
(July 9, 1819), in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 199 (ed.
Gerald Gunther 1969) [hereinafter Marshall, Friend of the Constitution VII] ("[O]ur
constitution is not a league. It is a government; and has all the constituent parts of a
government.").
46. However, it is important to note that Madison was incorrect in arguing that
constitutional forms of government were distinguished from confederate forms of
government on the basis that the former were established by the people, whereas the
latter were established by state legislatures. Like the United States Constitution, the
Confederate Constitution (1861) was established by the people and ratified by state
constitutional conventions. See CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF
AMERICA pmbl. ("We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its
sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent federal government,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity-invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God-do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of America.") and art.
VII, § 1 ("The ratification of the conventions of five States shall be sufficient for the
establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.").
47. Subsequent to the ratification of the Constitution, it was only appropriate that the
First Congress in 1789 gave custody and charge of all treaties and other international legal
instruments - including the Constitution, Articles of Confederation, and the Declaration
of Independence - to the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (which was the
forerunner of the United States Department of State). See "An act for establishing an
executive department to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs," 1 Stat. 29,
1" Cong. 1" Sess., ch. 4, § 4, (July 27, 1789); see also Roger A. Bruns, A More Perfect
Union: The Creation of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration (Dec. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.archives.gov/national-archives.experience/charters/constitution-history.html.
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treaty could replace the reciprocal obligations under an earlier treaty
made between the same states and addressing the same subject-
matter. s Otherwise, the states would have been violating their
obligations under the law of nations, and the states recognized the law
of nations.49
However, Professors Bruce Ackerman and Sanford Levinson
have argued that the Constitution was illegally ratified because
Article VII of the Constitution only required the Constitution's
ratification by nine state conventions to enter into force and Article
XIII of the Articles of Confederation required approval from all
thirteen state legislatures for the Articles to be altered.0 On the other
hand, Professor Akhil Reed Amar has argued that the Constitution's
ratification was legal because states had violated the Articles and
state-party breach of a treaty allows other states-parties to void the
treaty under international law. Therefore, the Articles had been
voided.51 Professor Amar's argument is the same that was used by
Madison at the Constitutional Convention in 1787.52 However, both
48. Cf 2 VATTEL, supra note 6, § 205 ("as treaties are made by the mutual agreement
of the parties, they may also be dissolved by mutual consent, at the free will of the
contracting powers"); Vienna Convention, art. 59 ("A treaty shall be considered as
terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject matter
and ... it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended
that the matter should be governed by that treaty .... ).
The Articles and the Constitution addressed the same subjects. Compare, e.g.,
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. IV-VI, IX, and XII-XIII (full faith and credit,
establishment of Congress, limitations on states, Congressional declaration of war,
previous debts, supremacy of constitutional law) with U.S. CONST. arts. I, IV, and VI
(same).
49. See, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dal.) 114, 120 (Pa. Oyer and
Terminer, 1784) ("principles of the laws of nations.., form part of the municipal law of
Pennsylvania"); Nathan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77, 78 (Common
Pleas, Philadelphia County, 1781) (law of nations part of common law and "consequently
extended to Pennsylvania"). Indeed, in Rutgers v. Waddington, the New York City
Mayor's Court in 1784 recognized that customary international law trumped a New York
statute.
50. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1058 (1984); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 130-31 (1988).
51. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
52. See, e.g., 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 424 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1968) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (Madison: "Although all the states have assented to the
Confederation, an infraction of any one article by one of the states is a dissolution of the
whole. This is the doctrine of the civil law on treaties."); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 122-23 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Madison: "[A]s far as
the articles of Union were to be considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among the
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Professor Amar and Madison cited no authorities from the law of
nations in support of their arguments.
The respective arguments of Professors Ackerman and Levinson,
and Professor Amar and Madison are both flawed. In the eighteenth
century, international legal scholars differed on whether a party could
terminate a bilateral treaty if another party violated the treaty.
Grotius and Vattel argued that even partial violation of a bilateral
treaty by one party allowed another party to terminate the treaty.53
On the other hand, Christian Wolff argued that partial violation of a
Governments of Independent States, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one
article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from <the whole> obligation.")
[hereinafter FARRAND]; see also Madison, Vices, supra note 34, para. 8 ([I]t seems to
follow from the doctrine of compacts, that a breach of any of the articles of the
confederation by any of the parties to it, absolves the other parties from their respective
obligations, and gives them a right if they chuse to exert it, of dissolving the Union
altogether.").
53. 2 VATTEL, supra note 6, § 200 ("The party.., who is offended or injured in those
particulars which constitute the basis of the treaty, is at liberty to choose the alternative of
either compelling a faithless ally to fulfil his engagements, or of declaring the treaty
dissolved by his violation of it.") and § 202 ("Some writers [ ] would extend what we have
just said to the different articles of a treaty which have no connection with the article that
has been violated,-saying we ought to consider those several articles as so many distinct
treaties concluded at the same time. They maintain, therefore, that, if either of the allies
violates one article of the treaty, the other has not immediately a right to cancel the entire
treaty, but that he may either refuse, in his turn, what he had promised with a view to the
violated article, or compel his ally to fulfil his promises if there still remains a possibility of
fulfilling them,-if not, to repair the damage; and that for this purpose he may threaten to
renounce the entire treaty,-a menace which he may lawfully put in execution, if it be
disregarded by the other. Such undoubtedly is the conduct which prudence, moderation,
the love of peace, and charity would commonly prescribe to nations. Who will deny this,
and madly assert that sovereigns are allowed to have immediate recourse to arms, or even
to break every treaty of alliance and friendship, for the least subject of complaint? But the
question here turns on the simple right, and not on the measures which are to be pursued
in order to obtain justice; and the principle upon which those writers ground their
decision, appears to me utterly indefensible. We cannot consider the several articles of the
same treaty as so many distinct and independent treaties: for, though we do not see any
immediate connection between some of those articles, they are all connected by this
common relation, viz. that the contracting powers have agreed to some of them in
consideration of the others, and by way of compensation. I would perhaps never have
consented to this article, if my ally had not granted me another, which in its own nature
has no relation to it. Every thing, therefore, which is comprehended in the same treaty, is
of the same force and nature as a reciprocal promise unless where a formal exception is
made to the contrary. Grotius very properly observes that "every article of a treaty carries
with it a condition, by the non-performance of which the treaty is wholly cancelled."[ ] He
adds, that a clause is sometimes inserted to the following effect, viz. "that the violation of
any one of the articles shall not cancel the whole treaty," in order that one of the parties
may not have, in every slight offence, a pretext for receding from his engagements. This
precaution is extremely prudent, and very conformable to the care which nations ought to
take of preserving peace, and rendering their alliances durable.").
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bilateral treaty did not allow the treaty's termination.' However,
even Vattel recognized that the violation of a multilateral peace treaty
by one party did not necessarily void the treaty:
The infractions of a treaty of peace by allies ... who joined in it
as principals, can therefore produce no rupture of it except with
regard to themselves, and do not affect it in what concerns their
ally, who, on his part, religiously observes his engagements.
With respect to him, the treaty subsists in full force ...
For some of the Framers, this rule appears to have extended to
other multilateral treaties because they believed that the violation of
any treaty was casus belli under the law of nations that effectively
made any treaty a peace treaty. For example, in discussing a
multilateral navigational treaty, William Grayson stated during the
Virginia Convention that "by the law of nations, if a negotiator makes
a treaty, in consequence of a power received from a sovereign
authority, non-compliance with his stipulations is a just cause of
war."56 Under Hobbesian natural law theory, the violation of treaties
returned states to a state of nature at war with each other. 7 Hamilton
appears to have ascribed to this tenet in discussing why violations of
the Articles had not terminated the Articles. During the
Constitutional Convention, Hamilton "denied the doctrine that the
States were thrown into a State of nature. He was not yet prepared to
admit the doctrine that the Confederacy, could be dissolved by partial
54. CHRISTIAN WOLFF, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 432 (James Brown Scott ed.,
Oxford U. Press 1934) (1750) ("if one ally violates a treaty as regards one term, the other
ally has no right for this reason to withdraw from the entire treaty .... .
55. 4 VATTEL, supra note 6, § 53.
56. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 342; see also VATTEL, supra note 6,
Preliminaries, § 3, n.1, para. 9 (Citing Vattel, Chitty notes: "If the perfect general rights or
law of nations be violated, then it appears to be conceded, that such violation may be the
actual and avowed ground of a just war; and it is even laid down that it is the duty of every
nation to chastise the nation guilty of the aggression."); see also CHRISTIAN WOLFF, 2
THE LAW OF NATIONS 293 in M.S.E. (Joseph H. Drake trans., Oxford Univ. Press) (1764)
("If in a doubtful case one nation is not willing to accept a conference for an amicable
adjustment or compromise, or to accept a submission to an arbiter, the one making the
offer has the right of war against the one unwilling to accept, by which the former is driven
to a settlement by force of arms.").
57. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XV, para. 1 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1651) ("From that law of Nature... there followeth a Third [natural
law]; which is this, That men performr their Covenants made: without which Covenants
are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, we are
still in the condition of warre.").
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infractions of it."58 Therefore, the partial breach of a multilateral
treaty by only some of its parties did not necessarily allow the treaty
to be dissolved. 9 Most importantly, those parties to a multilateral
treaty that violated the treaty remained legally bound by the treaty
regardless of their violations if the other parties wished to retain the
treaty. Although the Framers may have been divided as to exactly
what international law required of them in replacing the Articles, it is
clear that the international law of treaties was the governing law and
that the establishment of the Constitution could not violate the
international law governing treaties.
In the case of the Articles of Confederation, the Articles appears
to have been violated by some - not all - of the states by, inter alia,
making Congressionally unauthorized treaties with each other and
Indian tribes, violating treaties with other foreign states, and
maintaining navies and armies.' Professor Amar claims without
providing any supporting authority that "the Articles had been
routinely and flagrantly violated on all sides."'" However, it appears
58. 1 FARRAND, supra note 52, at 324-25.
59. Present international law has explicitly adopted this rule for all multilateral
treaties because present international law does not allow the violation of any treaty to be a
just cause for war. See Vienna Convention, art. 60(2) (listing acts that state-parties may
undertake in case of material breach of multilateral treaty by other state-party). Although
the rights to self-defense and the recommencement of hostilities for serious violations of a
peace treaty have been maintained under international law, treaty violations must be
resolved by pacific means under present international law. See, e.g., United Nations
Charter, June 26, 1945, art. 2 (3), 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered into force
Oct. 24, 1945) ("All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means....") [hereinafter UN Charter]; id. at art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations...."); General Treaty for the Renunciation of
War (Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 27, 1928; art. II, 46 Stat. 2343, 2346, 94 L.N.T.S. 57
(entered into force July 24, 1929) ("The High Contracting Parties agree that the
settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin
they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific
means."); Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, art. 40, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) ("Any
serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right of
denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately.").
60. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 424 (Madison: "Has not Georgia, in direct
violation of the Confederation, made war with the Indians, and concluded treaties? Have
not Virginia and Maryland entered into a partial compact? Have not Pennsylvania and
Jersey regulated the bounds of the Delaware?"); Madison, Vices, supra note 34, paras. 2-3
(maintenance of troops by Massachusetts, violation of treaties with Great Britain,
Holland, and France); CARL VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL: THE STORY OF THE
MAKING AND RATIFYING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 44 (1948) (nine
states organized navies).
61. Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, at 5,
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that some states (such as Connecticut and New Hampshire) were not
even accused of violating the Articles, much less accused of violating
their duties to all parties to the Articles. Therefore, the Articles could
have been retained by those states that did not violate the Articles if
they wished so. Moreover, those states that did violate the Articles
would have been still bound by the Articles regardless of their
previous violations. And, those states that did violate the Articles
often did not violate the Articles in respect to their treaty duties to all
of the other states. For example, the Congressionally unauthorized
Virginia-Maryland Compact (1785) regarding state boundaries did
not violate duties under the Articles in relation to some of the other
states, such as, e.g., Georgia.
However, it was difficult to enumerate exactly which and how
many of the thirteen states had faithfully observed the Articles
because states customarily do not admit that they have violated their
treaty obligations. It was clear that some states had violated the
Articles. Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia
had made treaties without Congressional authorization in violation of
the Articles.62 Other alleged violations were less clear. For example,
did Massachusetts violate the Articles by maintaining troops and a
navy? Or, were such troops a militia and was the navy necessary for
combating piracy - two exceptions allowed under the Articles?63
The issue of how many state convention ratifications were legally
necessary for replacing the Articles with the Constitution deeply
concerned the Framers because the Articles of Confederation was a
treaty whose obligations were to be observed. Madison recognized
that treaty law governed both subjects of voiding the Articles and of
the Constitution's ratification:
It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all
the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach
of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a
breach committed by either of the parties absolves the others;
and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the treaty
violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to
these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the
consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact,
available at http://216.239.39.100/search?q=cache:f8iFrlOlyuQJ:ni4d.us/library/
amarpaper.pdf+amar+ %22articles+of+confederation %22+Ackerman&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
(last visited June 3, 2003).
62. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI (no state without congressional
approval may enter into treaty with another state or foreign state).
63. Id.
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will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer
the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which
they may be confronted? 6"
A thirteen-state rule legally was unnecessary because some states
had violated the Articles.65 Madison's notes from the Constitutional
Convention indicate that the Convention's delegates supporting a
non-unanimity rule did so on two bases: (i) to ensure that a minority
of states could not frustrate a majority of states wishing to establish a
new constitution and (ii) to continue the Articles' nine-state rule for
deciding important issues, including the ratification of treaties.6 The
Constitutional Convention eventually adopted the nine-state
convention rule - a modification of the nine-state treaty rule under
the Articles. Of course, the Convention did not state exactly which
nine states conventions were needed to ratify the Constitution
because this probably would have been a difficult question to resolve
given that states probably would not admit or did not believe that
they had violated the Articles. To require the Constitution to name
which states conventions were required to ratify the Constitution
would have embarrassed the other states conventions whose
ratifications were not required and would have served to provoke the
latter to not ratify.
In summary, a treaty still was required to replace the Articles,
but practical and legal considerations allowed a non-unanimity rule to
be implemented for the ratification of the new treaty - viz., the
Constitution. The nine-state rule appeared to have been sufficiently
legal even to those states that initially opposed the Constitution (such
as North Carolina and Rhode Island) because such states did not avail
themselves of their opportunity to sue the other states for their
ratifications of the Constitution in an Articles federal court before the
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at § 9 (James Madison) (1788) (emphases added).
65. Of course, Madison's justification on the basis of treaty law was not quite correct.
See discussion supra Part 1.2.1.
66. See JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 496 (Aug.
30, 1787) (Butler "revolted at the idea, that one or two States should restrain the rest from
consulting their safety."); id. at 498 (Aug. 31, 1787) (Col. Mason: "Nine States had been
required in all great cases under the Confederation & that number was on that account
preferable."); see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 40, 191 (James Madison) (1788) ("the
absurdity of subjecting the fate of 12 States to the perverseness or corruption of a
thirteenth"); THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at § 9 (James Madison) (1788) ("To have required
the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential
interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member."); ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. IX (nine states needed for ratification of treaties).
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Constitutional government went into operation in March of 1789.
What is important to recognize from all of this is that the replacement
of the Articles of Confederation was governed by the international
law governing treaties and that the Articles as a treaty only could be
replaced by another treaty that could ensure the same reciprocal legal
relations. A unanimity rule was not legally applicable because the
Articles were not being altered. Instead, a new treaty (viz., the
Constitution) was being adopted and an earlier government replaced,
and the nine-state rule was the applicable rule under the Articles for
adopting a new treaty.
In the end, it is not so important to this Article's thesis that the
Constitution is a treaty whether the Framers got it right about
whether the Constitution's specific ratification process conformed to
the international law governing treaties - although they did get it
right. What is dispositive to determining whether the Constitution is a
treaty is the fact that the Framers presumed (correctly) that the
international law of treaties governed the Articles' dissolution and the
Constitution's establishment.
Consequently, the Constitution was "ratified" as other treaties
are "ratified."67 Also as a treaty, the Constitution came into force
when a certain pre-determined number of state conventions had
ratified the Constitution, thereby - as the language of the
Constitution puts it - "[e]stablishing. . . this Constitution between the
States."" After all, treaties are agreements made "between" states
and "governed by international law."'69
It is a mistake to claim that the Constitution is not a treaty
because its Preamble says that it was "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]"
by the people. ° It is important to note that the Constitution was
67. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law." Vienna Convention, art. 2(1)(a).
70. U.S. CONST. pmbl. Strictly speaking, it is also incorrect to claim, as Thomas
Jefferson stated, that the Constitution is "a compact of independent nations." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Edward Everett (Apr. 8, 1826), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 151 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1955). The Constitution expressly
says that it was a constitution between the states - not nations. Nations or peoples are not
identical to states, and the Constitution's Preamble makes mention of only one people
(i.e., nation). U.S. CONST. art. VII. However, assuming that Jefferson meant "states"
instead of "nations," Jefferson was correct to claim that the Constitution was a treaty
"subject to the rules acknowledged in similar cases." Id. Like the Framers, Jefferson
recognized that the law governing treaties also governed the Constitution.
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ratified by individual state conventions - not by the American people
as a whole. There was no single constitutional convention attended
by all of the American people residing in the thirteen individual
states.71 The ordination and establishment of the Constitution by the
people could only take place after the Constitution's ratification by
individual state conventions. Indeed, the American people as a whole
could not ratify the Constitution according to its terms. The
Constitution expressly required ratification by individual state
conventions.72
To claim that the Constitution is not a treaty because it was
ordained and established by the people is to flagrantly ignore its
ratification process - a process that established it as a treaty and a
process that the Framers explicitly stated was governed by the law of
treaties. However, the Preamble's "We the People" legally serves to
preclude the possibility that the replacement of the Articles was
illegal because the law of nations recognized that the original locus of
sovereignty resided in the people.73 An appeal to merely domestic
social contract theory would have been legally insufficient because
such theory did not apply to inter-state relations. Any remaining
question as to the lawfulness of the Constitution's establishment was
mooted.
71. This is not to say that treaties cannot be ratified by convention or plebiscite.
Under international law, treaties can be ratified not only by states but also by the people
in a plebiscite or through representatives in convention. For example, the Treaty of
Maastricht (1992) was submitted to the Danish, Swiss, Irish, and Norwegian peoples for
ratification by plebiscite because of their respective constitutional law requirements. See
A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, "Ratification," available at
http://www.euro-know.org.dictionary/r.html (last visited May 24, 2003).
72. U.S. CONST. art VII. Ratification by conventions instead of legislatures only
grounds the legal instrument in firmer legal authority. A helpful analogy is when a person
exercising power of attorney signs a contract with another party. Whether or not it is the
party's representative or the party itself that signs the contract has no bearing on whether
it is a contract. Whether or not the treaty is ratified by legislatures or conventions has no
bearing on whether it is a treaty.
73. J.J. BURLAMAQUI, 2 THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW, pt. II,
ch. VI, § VI (Thomas Nugent trans., 5 h ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1807) (1748)
("sovereignty resides originally in the people") [hereinafter BURLAMAQUI]; FRANCISCO
DE VITORIA, ON THE LAW OF WAR (1557); see Ruben C. Alvarado, Fountainhead of
Liberalism, 10 COMMON L. REV. (1994), available at
http://www.wordbridge.net/ccsp/cml0_font.html (last visited 15 Feb. 2003) (sovereignty
resides in peoples (i.e., nations) - not states - under international law).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
1.2.2. Being a Treaty, the Constitution Is Governed by Customary
International Legal Norms Through Their Incorporation in the
Constitution.
For the Framers, the Constitution could not violate customary
international law. For example, Randolph, Madison, and others
argued that the Constitution did not allow Congress to violate state
navigational rights because this would violate the law of nations -
even if there was no explicit prohibition in the Constitution. During
the Virginia state constitutional convention, Governor Randolph
stated:
The gentleman wishes us to show him a clause [in the
Constitution] which shall preclude Congress from giving away
this right [to navigation on the Mississippi River]. It is first
incumbent upon him to show where the right is given up. There
is a prohibition naturally resulting from.., the law of...
nations, to yield the most valuable right of a community, for the
exclusive benefit of one particular part of it.74
The Constitution as a treaty could not violate the law of nations.75
Although few treaties explicitly require that they be governed by
international law,76 treaties often incorporate international legal
norms. After all, if a treaty is a written agreement between states
"governed by international law," the best way to ensure that the
agreement is governed by international law is to explicitly write such
international law into the agreement.' It is no different with the
Constitution. For example, the Supremacy Clause explicitly states
74. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 362; see also Jules Lobel, The Limits of
Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L.
REV. 1071, 1094-95 (1985) [hereinafter Lobel, Limits]; cf. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 100, 132-33 (1923) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ("principles of international comity,
which exists between friendly nations, in my opinion, forbids the construction of the
Eighteenth Amendment ... which the present decision advances").
75. See infra-Part 4; cf 2 VATrEL, supra note 6, § 165:
A sovereign already bound by a treaty cannot enter into others contrary to the
first. The things respecting which he has entered into engagements are no longer
at his disposal. If it happens that a posterior treaty be found, in any particular
point, to clash with one of more ancient date, the new treaty is null and void with
respect to that point, inasmuch as it tends to dispose of a thing that is no longer in
the power of him who appears to dispose of it. (We are here to be understood as
speaking of treaties made with different powers.)
76. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art.
21(1)(b), UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (entered into force July 1, 2002) (mandating
application of other treaties and rules of international law).
77. See Vienna Convention, art. 2(1)(a).
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that treaties (like the Constitution) are part of "the supreme Law of
the Land."7  Furthermore, the Constitution incorporates many
substantive international legal norms. For example, the Constitution
has incorporated the international legal principle of state co-equality79
guaranteeing full faith and credit between the states.0  Also
incorporating the law of nations, the Constitution did not allow the
federal government to violate the territorial integrity of the states
(without their consent)." As under the Articles of Confederation (a
treaty), the Constitution guarantees that states retained their
international legal personality by being able to enter into agreements
with each other and with foreign states, subject to Congressional
approval.' The Constitution also incorporates the international legal
doctrine of state succession regarding continuity of treaty obligations
by expressly recognizing that the United States is still bound by
treaties that the United States entered into under the Articles of
Confederation." The Eleventh Amendment also effectively ensured
the retention of state sovereign immunity (guaranteed by the law of
nations) from federal suits prosecuted by citizens of another state, or
citizens or subjects of foreign states."
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
79. See, e.g., VATrEL, supra note 6, Preliminaries, at § 18 ("[s]mall republic is no less
a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom."); UN Charter, art. 2(1) (sovereign
equality of states).
80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (full faith and credit clause). Consequently, Congress has
included in each state's act of admission a clause providing that the state enters the Union
"on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever." 1 Stat. 491 (1796).
Prior to 1796, the acts of admission for Vermont and Kentucky contained different but
similar terminology. 1 Stat. 191 (1791); 1 Stat. 189 (1791).
81. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3; 2 VATTEL, supra note 6, § 93 (prohibition of usurpation
of territory); UN Charter, art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting states from threatening or using force
against state's territorial integrity or political independence).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. However, other federal nation-states, such as
Germany and Switzerland, allow their constitutive states to enter into treaties among
themselves without approval from their respective central governments.
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[A]ll Treaties made.., shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.") (emphasis added); 2 VATrEL, supra note 6, § 191; SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE
LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONs, bk. VIII, ch. ix, § 8 (James Brown Scott ed., 1933) (1672)
(recognizing successor state responsibility for complying with treaties entered into by
earlier state) [hereinafter PUFENDORF].
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in response to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793). After the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, Chisholm was dismissed.
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). Although the Eleventh
Amendment did not ensure absolute state sovereign immunity from federal suits, states
(United States or foreign) often surrender aspects of their sovereignty (including
immunity from suits). This surrender does not alter their status as states. As Justice Jay
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Furthermore, the substantive text of the Constitution addresses a
plethora of international legal matters appropriate for a treaty. In
terms of legal hierarchy and jurisdiction, the Constitution expressly
establishes that treaties are part of the supreme law of the land, that
the President can make treaties (with Senate consent), that the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over cases involving treaties, and that
Congress can define and punish violations of the law of nations.85 In
terms of substantive content, the Constitution addresses customary
international legal matters such as war, piracy, ambassadors,
naturalization, and trade."
Perhaps most revealing about the Constitution's incorporation of
international law is that the Constitution explicitly states that it was
established by "the people," ' which was the original locus of
sovereignty according to international law. The Constitution's
Preamble placed the Constitution's foundation on the international
legal principle of popular sovereignty forward and center.8 Indeed,
the Constitution's ratification process through individual state
conventions may have reflected a more legally authentic ratification
process than that of most other treaties. The ratification process of
most other treaties often involved the participation of fewer
representatives of the people. For example, ratification of most
treaties only required the consent of the crown.
When the Constitution's preamble states "[w]e the People of the
United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union," these clauses
denoted that the "people" singular (as sovereign in relations both
stated in Chisholm even before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, "suability and
state sovereignty are not incompatible." 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 473 (Jay, J.). Indeed, the very
recognition of statehood is premised on a state's recognition of international legal norms
that inherently limit state sovereignty.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (law of nations); art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaties); art. III § 2
(treaty jurisdiction); art. VI, § 2 (treaties as supreme law of land).
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (state and foreign trade); art. I, § 4 (naturalization);
art. I, § 10 (piracy); art. I, § 11 (war); art. II, §2, cl. 2 (ambassadors)..
87. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
88. Although James Wilson (both the Preamble's drafter and an international legal
specialist) stated that the Constitution's government was not "founded upon compact; it is
founded upon the power of the people," one must be careful to note that he is talking
about the Constitution's foundation - not the kind of legal instrument that the
Constitution is. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 497. This is made clear by the rest
of Wilson's remarks: "[the Constitution's government] is founded upon the power of the
people. They express in their name and their authority-'We, the people, do ordain and
establish,' &c.; from their ratification alone. it is to take its constitutional authenticity;
without that, it is no more than tabula rasa." Id.
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external and internal to the Union) were confirming 9 the lawful
establishment of a new government for the "nation-states" plural -
not a "nation-state" singular.' In this way the American people could
make a social compact that disabled the states from withdrawing from
the Constitution if one of them should violate it. Only the people as a
whole could dissolve the constitutional compact - not the individual
states (nor their respective citizens). The states per se retained a
residual sovereignty derivative of their respective citizens, but their
external sovereignty was limited because that external sovereignty
resided more fully in the consolidated people of the United States
exercised through the federal government. 9' However, as under the
Articles of Confederation (a treaty), the fact that states qua states
were retained indicates that the Constitution is a treaty, too. After
all, if the Constitution was not a treaty between states and binding on
the states, why retain the states as states? At least one Framer
considered the possibility of not retaining the states as states. James
Patterson had considered proposing the elimination of the states at
the Constitutional Convention, but he eventually rejected this idea
89. The people of the United States only "confirmed" the legitimacy of the new
government established by the Constitution. The "People" (i.e., nation) and the "United
States" existed prior to the Constitution's ratification. The Declaration of Independence
earlier had declared a new nation and new states in 1776. DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, para. 5 ("We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of
America, in General Congress, Assembled.... do, in the Name, and by Authority of the
good People of these Colonies...."(emphasis added)); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
art. IV ("The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among
the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States,
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several States .... "(emphasis added)).
90. The Constitution refers to the United States only in the plural except when it is a
party to a case. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority... to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party." (emphasis added)); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies.") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." (emphasis added)). Early constitutional
jurists also referred to the United States as plural. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1160 (1833)
[hereinafter STORY] ("United States are responsible to foreign governments for all
violations of the law of nations.") (emphasis added).
91. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77, 78-79 (1941) ("Save for the powers
committed by the Constitution to the Union, the State of Florida has retained the status of
a sovereign... When its action does not conflict with federal legislation, the sovereign
authority of the State over the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas is analogous to the
sovereign authority of the United States over its citizens in like circumstances.").
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because such action would have diminished the sovereignty of the
states, which he-as author of the New Jersey Plan-wanted to
avoid.9 Also during the Constitutional Convention, Rufus King
analogized the Constitution's retention of states to the Treaty of
Union between the English and Scottish states.93
1.3 States' Rights & Nationalism: Early 19th Century Misunderstandings
About International Law and the Constitution's Status as a Federal
Treaty.
However, the idea that the Constitution was a treaty was debated
later during the early years of the Republic in the contexts of state
nullification of federal laws, state and national sovereignty, compact
theory, and, ultimately, slavery. During these debates, the nationalists
(such as John Marshall, Daniel Webster and Joseph Story) argued
that the Constitution was not such a treaty because such a treaty
allowed its individual states-parties unilaterally to construe the treaty
that could lead to another state-party claiming a treaty violation and
the latter's lawful withdrawal from the treaty.94 This was untrue. The
Articles of Confederation, the United States-Britain (Jay) Treaty
(1794), and the Treaty of Ghent (1814) had provisions respectively
providing for the establishment of international courts and/or boards
92. Notes of William Paterson in the Federal Convention of 1787, in "Notes
Apparently Used by Patterson in Preparing the New Jersey Plan, June 13-15," available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/cpnst/patterson.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2003). In his
preliminary notes on the New Jersey Plan, Patterson considered proposing the dissolution
of the states and transforming them into only districts:
Whereas it is necessary in Order to form the People of the U. S. of America into
a Nation, that the States should be consolidated, by which Means all the Citizens
thereof will become equally intitled to and will equally participate in the same
Privileges and Rights,... that all the Lands contained within the Limits of each
State individually, and of the U. S. generally be considered as constituting one
Body or Mass, and be divided into thirteen or more integral Parts.... Resolved,
That such Divisions or integral Parts shall be styled Districts.
93. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 52, at 492-93 ("Mr. King was for preserving the States
in a subordinate degree.... He did not think a full answer had been given to those who
apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions.... The articles of Union
between Engld. & Scotland furnish an example of such a provision in favor of sundry
rights of Scotland.").
94. See Marshall, Friend of the Constitution VII, supra note 45 ("[Olur constitution is
not a league. It is a government; and has all the constituent parts of a government.");
Daniel Webster, Speech to Congress, in THE SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL
WEBSTER, WITH AN ESSAY ON DANIEL WEBSTER AS A MASTER OF ENGLISH STYLE
(Edwin Whipple ed., 1879) (states are "own judges" in construing treaty because of
absence of "superior" authority) [hereinafter Webster, Speech]; STORY, supra note 90, §
321 passim (each state allowed to construe treaty because of absence of "common
arbiter").
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of commissioners to resolve treaty disputes between states-parties.9"
The Constitution also created an international court: the United
States Supreme Court.96 Indeed, courts established under both the
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution were called "federal
courts." 97 Furthermore, Story contradicted himself. On the one hand,
he (incorrectly) argued that states could unilaterally withdraw from
treaties, but on the other hand, he (correctly) recognized that the
states could not unilaterally withdraw from the Articles of
Confederation, which was a treaty.98
Marshall argued that confederations (unlike a constitutional
government) generally could not independently execute its own
resolutions.' This also was not necessarily true. The Continental
Army executed the resolutions of the Articles Congress. Marshall
also argued that unlike the Constitution that is formed by the whole
people acting in convention, a "league is formed by the sovereigns
[i.e., state legislatures] who become members of it.""'° Again, this was
not necessarily true. The Constitution was not formed by the whole
of the American people acting in single constitutional convention. It
was formed by thirteen separate state conventions.
Finally, Marshall argued that unlike Congressional
95. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (providing for court and boards of
commissioners); Jay Treaty, art. 6 (1794), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britian/ay.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003)
(providing for board of commissioners); Treaty of Ghent, art. 4 (1814), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britian/ghent.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003)
(providing for board of commissioners).
96. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902) (stating that the Supreme
Court was sitting as international tribunal in dispute between Kansas and Colorado). The
Supreme Court also described itself as an international court when sitting as a prize court
because prize cases were determined by the law of nations. Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 54, 91 (1795) ("A prize court is, in effect, a court of all the nations in the world,
because all persons, in every part of the world, are concluded by its sentences.").
97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at § 3 (Alexander Hamilton) (1787) (referring to federal
court established under the Articles for settling dispute between Connecticut and
Pennsylvania); see Connecticut v. Pennsylvania, 23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 6-32 (1912) (1783 dispute over Wyoming Valley adjudicated by federal court
established under the Articles).
98. Compare STORY, supra note 90, § 321 (Arguing that each state is allowed to
construe treaty because of absence of "common arbiter") with § 353 ("it was deemed a
political heresy to maintain, that under [the Articles of Confederation] any state had a
right to withdraw from it at pleasure, and repeal its operation; and that a party to the
compact had a right to revoke that compact." [citing THE FEDERALIST NoS. 22, 43]).
99. Marshall, Friend of the Constitution VII, supra note 45, at 199 ("A government, on
the contrary, carries its resolutions into execution by its own means.").
100. Id. at 202.
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representatives that are not constitutionally bound to act in
conformity with instructions from their state legislatures, "the
representatives of sovereigns in league with each other, act in
subordination to those sovereigns, and under their particular
instructions."'0 1  Again, this was not quite true. Delegates to
intergovernmental organizations created by treaty are not necessarily
prohibited from acting independently of their states.1 2 Indeed, there
was nothing in the Articles of Confederation that prevented the
delegates from voting in disregard of their instructions (if any) from
their states absent the possibility of recall after they had disregarded
their instructions.0 3 Inversely, there was nothing in Constitution that
prevented state legislatures from ordering their Senators to vote in
conformity with their instructions.' Indeed, at least one Senator was
censured by his state legislature for failing to obey its instructions.05
Finally, it is striking that both Marshall and Story who sat on the
Supreme Court never rejected the idea that the Constitution was a
treaty in their Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions - either
when writing for the Supreme Court or a Circuit Court, or in a
concurring or dissenting opinion. They certainly had the opportunity
to do so in several cases challenging the unconstitutionality of federal
law and state laws.' Indeed, no United States Supreme Court
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Union, art. 213, para. 2, 31 I.L.M. 247
(1992) ("The Members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the Community,
be completely independent in the performance of their duties. In the performance of these
duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any
other body. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. Each
Member State undertakes to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the
Members of the Commission in the performance of their tasks."); Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation, June 28, 1919, art. 7 (entered into force January 10,
1920) ("Delegates to the Conference, members of the Governing Body and the Director-
General and officials of the Office shall likewise enjoy such privileges and immunities as
are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the
Organization."). Indeed, commissioners to the European Union are required to vote
independently from their members states.
103. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, para. 1.
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof... ; and each Senator
shall have one vote."). This clause was amended by the Seventeenth Amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof... ; and each Senator shall have
one vote.").
105. See E. McPherson, The Southern States and the Reporting of Senate Debates, 1789-
1802, 12 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 223, 228-35 (1946).
106. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (Wheat.) 1 (1824) (per Marshall) (suit
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decision has held that the Constitution is not a treaty.
However, the states' rights advocates (such as Thomas Jefferson,
John Calhoun, and Spencer Roane) also got it wrong. Although the
Constitution was a treaty °7 (as they correctly argued), it was a federal
compact made by the whole of the American people and which could
not be dissolved by the individual states or citizens therein (as they
disputed)." Although the Constitution was a treaty, individual states
could not nullify federal law and could not secede from the
Constitution"° because the Constitution provided for a Supreme
Court to resolve conflicts between the federal government and the
states. The law of nations (to which the states were bound) required
states-parties to a treaty to seek a peaceful resolution to a claimed
treaty violation through arbitration, and the Constitution provided
such the means through the establishment of the Supreme Court."0 If
challenging New York statute); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(per Marshall) (suit challenging federal law).
107. Subsequent to the Declaration of Independence, some states did declare their
own independence and negotiated their own treaties with other foreign states, hence
disclosing the fact that many states did consider themselves sovereign also in their external
relations with foreign states. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An
Historical Study, 12 AM. HIST. REv. 529 (1907).
108. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 90, § 311.
109. See, e.g., John C. Calhoun, The South Carolina Exposition and Protest (1828), 10
THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 442 (1977) (stating that people in state convention
could nullify federal law's effect within state, and federal government's persistent attempt
to enforce law justified state secession); Congressional Resolution introduced by
Pennsylvania (Jan. 11, 1811) (drafted by Roane) (declaring Constitution "to all intents and
purposes" was "a treaty among sovereign states" and its "general government, by this
treaty, was not constituted the exclusive or final judge of the powers it was to exercise; for
if it were so to judge, then its judgment, and not the constitution, would be the measure of
its authority."), in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 150 (ed.
Gerald Gunther 1969); Kentucky Legislature Resolutions of Interposition (1798) (drafted
by Jefferson) ("That the Government created by this compact was not made the exclusive
or final judge of the extent the measure of its powers; but that as in all other cases of
compact among parties having no common judge, each party had an equal right to judge
for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.").
110. 2 VATIEL, supra note 6, § 338 ("If the subject of the dispute be an injury received,
the offended party ought to follow the rules we have just established. His own advantage,
and that of human society, require, that, previous to taking up arms, he should try every
pacific mode of obtaining either a reparation of the injury, or a just satisfaction, unless
there be substantial reasons to dispense with his recurrence to such measures."); id., §
329.4, para. 1 ("When once the contending parties have entered into articles of arbitration,
they are bound to abide by the sentence of the arbitrators: they have engaged to do this;
and the faith of treaties should be religiously observed."); id., § 329.4, para. 4 ("The Swiss
have had the precaution, in all their alliances among themselves, and even in those they
have contracted with the neighbouring powers, to agree beforehand on the manner in
which their disputes were to be submitted to arbitrators, in case they could not adjust them
in an amicable manner. This wise precaution has not a little contributed to maintain the
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the states allegedly violated their constitutional obligations to each
other or the federal government violated the Constitution, the
Constitution provided' redress by having the issue settled by an
international tribunal - the United States Supreme Court."' Although
Roane conceded that the Supreme Court had constitutional power to
decide cases between states, he still argued that the Constitution did
not give the Supreme Court "jurisdiction over its own controversies,
with a state or states.""' 2 To have done so would have made the
Supreme Court the final judge in its own case because the Supreme
Court was part of the federal government. Of course, this argument
fails to recognize that the independence of the .federal judiciary is
established by the Constitution's separation of powers arrangement
and its judicial life appointments, and that the appointment of
Supreme Court justices Was confirmed by Senators appointed by the
states.
States did not have the right to secede just because another state
allegedly had violated its constitutional obligations to the other states
or that the federal government had violated the Constitution. Indeed,
to a certain extent this issue already had been settled some seventy
years earlier when the Constitutional Convention adopted the nine-
state convention ratification rule for establishing the Constitution.
State breach of the Articles of Convention did not dissolve the
Articles altogether because not all states had violated the Articles."3
Helvetic republic in that flourishing state which secures her liberty, and renders her
respectable throughout Europe.").
111. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States... to
Controversies between two or more States."). International tribunals (such as the U.S.
Supreme Court) often have jurisdiction to decide whether the action by an
intergovernmental organization is lawful under its constitutive treaty. For example, the
International Court of Justice opined that Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization's constitution did not authorize establishment of Maritime Safety
Committee. Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Committee, Advisory Opinion, 1960 I.C.J. 150 (June 8, 1960); see
also Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 1 (July 8, 1996) (World Health Organization (WHO) did not have
authority to ask the ICJ for advisory opinion under WHO's constitution). Indeed,
international tribunals often also have the authority to nullify laws enacted by
intergovernmental legislatures. See, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany v. European
Parliament & Council of the European Union, C-376/98, Eur. Ct. J. (2000) (annulling EU
directive banning tobacco advertising as violation of European Community Treaty).
112. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 153 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969).
113. Even the Articles of Confederation provided for "supreme courts" to decide such
controversies through the vehicles of Congressionally appointed courts and boards of
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Much later, when the southern states did secede .and establish their
own constitution that also provided for the establishment of a
Confederate Supreme Court, the Confederate Congress refused to
enact implementing legislation to establish their Supreme Court
because the Congress recognized that the Confederate Supreme
Court could have nullified decisions from state supreme courts and,
thereby, undercut states' rights."14 Consequently, when North Carolina
became unhappy with the Confederacy's conduct of the war, some
North Carolinians in 1863 considered calling for a state convention in
order to secede from the Confederacy. One of the reasons why the
Confederacy was dysfunctional probably was its failure to implement
its Supreme Court to settle conflicts.
These constitutional principles partially reflected the United
States Constitution's character as a foedus. A foedus was a suzerainty-
type of treaty imposed on nations by the Roman Empire. Such
nations could not withdraw from their foedus with Rome. A suzerain
was a nation that controlled the international affairs of other nations
but allowed them to exercise sovereignty over their domestic
matters. 5 Accordingly, these nations could not violate or suspend
norms established by the law of nations ("jus gentium") of which the
foedus was part. Similar to a foedus, the Constitution was a treaty
whose provisions could not be violated or suspended, or from which
no state could withdraw - much like many modern multilateral and
constituent treaties that do not allow their provisions to be violated or
suspended, do not provide for the withdrawal of its parties, and
provide for international tribunals. 6 The Constitution established a
federal form of government. Indeed, the word "federal" comes from
the word "foedus." The very idea of a federal constitution is one
commissioners. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (providing for courts and boards
of commissioners).
114. CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA art. III, para. 1
(1861) (providing for establishment of Confederate Supreme Court).
115. See 2 VATTEL, supra note 6, § 152 ("A treaty, in Latin foedus, is a compact made
with a view to the public welfare, by the superior power, either for perpetuity, or for a
considerable time.").
116. See, e.g., UN Charter, arts. 94 and 103 (Art. 94 states that UN members are
required to comply with International Court of Justice decisions. Art. 103 states: "In the
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under
the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."); Vienna Convention, art. 60(5)
(termination or suspension of humanitarian treaty not justified by breach); UN Human
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 26(61), U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.1/Add.8
(1997) (state-party cannot denounce or withdraw from ICCPR).
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rooted in international law."7  The Constitution as a "federal
compact" was a "treaty constitution.
''118
Given the Constitution's success, it is no surprise that states in
other regions subsequently have modeled both their intra- and inter-
governmental bodies on the United States Constitution's federal
system. 9  It also is no surprise that both global and regional,
multilateral human rights treaties have been modeled on the
Constitution and its Bill of Rights.'2 ° Indeed, the Constitution as a
federal treaty may be the most successful international instrument in
history if the number of nation-states that have adopted its political
and legal structure is any measure.'
Why then did the nationalists insist on saying that the
Constitution was not a treaty? Although even Story referred to the
117. See SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 315 (1993) (arguing that when Madison used "foederal" in context of
compact federalism, he meant contemporary conventional sense of foedus, or treaty).
118. One writer has argued - albeit somewhat summarily - that because amendments
to the Constitution do not require unanimous consent from the states, the Constitution is
no longer a treaty. Torkel Opsahl, An "International Constitutional Law"? 10 INT'L. &
COMP. L.Q. 760, 771 (1961) ("If the original concept [of the Constitution] had been
adhered to, it goes without saying the amendments could only have taken place by the
conclusion of an additional treaty."). However, constituent treaties often "force" their
states-parties to accept new obligations and new states-parties, and to comply with other
actions undertaken pursuant to the treaty. See, e.g., UN Charter, art. 18 (2) (admission of
new states to UN only on basis of two-thirds of General Assembly members); id. at art. 2
(5) (UN members required to give UN "every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the [UN] Charter"); id. at art. 108 (amendments binding on all UN
members when adopted by two-thirds of General Assembly and Security Council). If a
state agrees to a treaty provision whose future implementation conflicts with the state's
wishes, that does not mean that the state's sovereignty or consent has been nullified.
Indeed, state consent to a treaty generally reflects a self-imposed limitation of its own
sovereignty because the treaty inherently limits actions by the sovereign state. This state
self-imposed limit on sovereignty extends not only to "internal" matters but also
"external" matters. Hence, the Constitution as a treaty can limit the individual state's
sovereignty both as to internal matters (e.g., human rights, state admission) and external
matters (e.g., making treaties).
119. The European Union is the most successful and well-known intergovernmental
example. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253.
Intra-governmental examples include Canada, Switzerland, and Australia.
120. Compare the substantive rights provisions of, e.g., the ICCPR, ECHR, and ACHR
with the Constitution's rights provisions and Bill of Rights. See also LOuIS HENKIN, THE
AGE OF RIGHTS (1990) (modem manifestation of human rights drawn from Constitution
and Bill of Rights).
121. See Siegfried Wiessner, The Movement Toward Federalism in Italy: A Policy-
Oriented Perspective, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 301, 302 (2003) ("it is estimated that over
forty percent of the Earth's territory and fifty-two percent of the world's population are
governed by more or less federally organized systems of government").
I v V t J l J
Constitution as a "federal compact," '22 there appears to be no
literature explicitly describing the Constitution 
as a "federal treaty.
' 23
The reason probably can be found in American legacy of slavery. As
what often happens in heated, politically charged debates, the
participants on both sides used overreaching arguments. The states'
rights advocates used the idea of the Constitution as treaty to buttress
states' rights and to secure the institution of slavery. However, in
doing so, the states' rights proponents overreached. However, the
nationalists also overreached as well as contradicted themselves. For
the nationalists, the Constitution perhaps had come to represent
rhetorically all of what the Articles of Confederation was not -
including its status as a treaty.
Of course, the question of whether states could withdraw from
the Union was eventually and effectively decided by the Civil War,
the legal question being later decided by the Supreme Court.
124
Because the nationalists' conclusions finally won the day, they were
able to rhetorically break the Constitution from its legal moorings as
a treaty and set it adrift on the high seas of international legal
unaccountability. The Constitution has become law accountable only
to itself, its expositors increasingly have 
become buccaneers.
125
However, this was only a rhetorical victory - one won by employing
overreaching, contradictory, and false premises. The rejection of the
idea that the Constitution was a treaty became another casualty of the
Civil War, but, as discussed below (Parts 2-5), the resurrection of this
idea is not only necessary to ensure that the United States'
international legal obligations do not conflict with the Constitution
but also that constitutional construction itself is coherent.
122. STORY, supra note 90, at § 311.
123. If the Articles of Confederation was a federal compact or treaty, as the Framers
held, why wouldn't the Constitution as a federal compact also be a treaty? See, e.g.,
JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF 1787 105-06 (Galliard Hunt &
James Brown Scott eds., 1920) (June 16, 1787) (Patterson describing Articles of
Confederation as federal compact); (June 30, 1787) (Madison describing Articles of
Confederation as federal compact); id. at 309-10 (July 23, 1787) (Govr. Morris describing
Articles of Confederation as federal compact). Isn't a federal compact a treaty in that the
use of the word "federal" limits the meaning of "compact" to refer only to treaty compacts
and not other kinds of compacts, such as contracts.
124. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726 (1869) (Texas could not unilaterally
secede from the Union).
125. See infra text accompanying notes 136-50 (discussing federal courts' adoption of
last-in-time rule and diminished legal authority of customary international law).
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2. The Constitution's Hierarchical Structure of Legal Authority
Based on International Law "
The hierarchical structure of legal authority in the Constitution
reflects an international legal perspective consistent with the
Constitution's status as a treaty. Again, if a treaty is a written
agreement between states governed by international law, the best way
to ensure that the agreement is governed by international law is to
explicitly write such international law into the agreement.12 6 The
Constitution gives international law a unique kind of legal authority.
Of all the specific sources of law mentioned in the Constitution, only
three cannot be unilaterally made by either the federal government or
individual states of the Union: the law of nations, treaties, and the
Constitution (which is also a treaty for the aforementioned reasons).
Other sources of law mentioned in the Constitution can be
unilaterally made and un-made by either the federal government or
the individual states of the Union. Federal statutes unilaterally can
be made by the federal government as well as invalidated if they
violate the Constitution or are repealed by subsequent federal law.127
States can unilaterally make and un-make state law, and the federal
government unilaterally can invalidate such law by passing conflicting
federal law.12 ' An individual state unilaterally can make common law
and unilaterally unmake it by enacting conflicting statutes.
The other specific sources mentioned in the Constitution cannot
unilaterally be made. Those sources of law are the law of nations,
treaties, and the Constitution. The Constitution states that Congress
may only "define" offenses against the law of nations, and the records
from the Constitutional Convention make it clear that the word
"define" meant "clarify" - not "create. 129 It only makes sense that
126. See Vienna Convention, art. 2(1)(a).
127. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803) ("an act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution, is void").
128. U.S. CONST. art. VI (Supremacy Clause).
129. 2 FARRAND, supra note 52, at 61 ("To pretend to define the law of nations which
depended on the authority of all the Civilized Nations of the World, would have a look of
arrogance. that would make us ridiculous. Mr. Govr: The word define is proper when
applied to offences in this case; the law of nations being often too vague and deficient to
be a rule.").
The authority to define and punish "Offences against the Law of Nations" includes
both criminal and non-criminal violations of the law of nations. See STORY, supra note 90,
at § 1160 ("As the United States are responsible to foreign governments for all violations
of the law of nations,... congress ought to possess the power to define and punish all such
offences, which may interrupt our intercourse and harmony with, and our duties to
them."); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Of
I ........
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the United States (or any other foreign state) cannot unilaterally
make the law of nations because; by definition, such law is made by
"nations" plural. All the United States can do, is to "contribute" to
the formation of the law of nations by making or refusing to sign
treaties, or acquiescing or objecting to an emerging customary
international law norm.130
However, in the case of treaties per se, the Constitutional text is
less clear at first glance. It is textually clear that the President with
the two-thirds of the Senate can make treaties. It is less textually
clear that the federal government can un-make treaties because
treaties can only be made with the consent of other nations. The
structure of the treaty process indicates that the federal government
can un-make treaties under certain circumstances according to the lex
specialis governing the treaty process. This lex specialis, namely, the
conventional and customary international law of treaties, recognizes
that the federal government can withdraw its consent or dissolve the
treaty on a number of grounds, including treaty violation by its treaty
partner, a fundamental change of circumstances, and - most
importantly - if the treaty manifestly violates constitutional law."'
The federal government also can un-make treaties if the treaty itself
allows it. But, the federal government cannot lawfully unilaterally
"violate" its treaty obligations. Furthermore, the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause made it clear that the individual states of the
Union could not violate the United States' treaty law obligations.
Contrast the Supremacy Clause's language dealing with federal
Offences Against the Law of Nations, ch. 5 (1760) (ed. St. George Tucker 1803) (listing
both criminal and non-criminal offenses against the law of nations).
130. A method of explicitly accepting an emerging customary international law norm is
to enter into a treaty that recognizes the norm. The customary method of effectively
objecting to an emerging customary international law norm is to not enter into a treaty
recognizing the norm or make a reservation concerning the treaty norm and attach it to
the ratified treaty when deposited.
131. 2 VATrEL, supra note 6, §§ 202 (breach) and 296 (change of circumstances);
Vienna Convention, arts. 46 (fundamental law), 60 (breach), and 62 (fundamental change
of circumstances); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, arts.
46, 60, and 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15, 25 I.L.M. 543 (fundamental law, breach, change
of circumstances) [hereinafter Vienna Convention-SIO].
The United States State Department has recognized the Vienna Convention's
substantive provisions "as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." S.
Exec. Doc. L. 92d Cong., 1" Sess. (1971) p.1; see, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29
(1982) (using Vienna Convention); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (S.W. Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution No. 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J.16 at 47 (Vienna Convention reflects customary
international law).
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laws with that of treaties. In regard to federal law, the Supremacy
Clause says that "the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance [of the Constitution] ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land." In regard to treaties, the Supremacy Clause says that "all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Federal laws
are only made in pursuance of the Constitution. On the other hand,
treaties are made under the authority of the United States. The
language of the Supremacy Clause indicates that treaties have greater
authority than federal laws by virtue of treaties being made under the
authority of the United States, whereas the authority of federal laws
is only derivative from the Constitution. The Constitution only says
how treaties are to be made under the authority of the United States
(viz., by the President with the advice and consent of two-thirds of
Senators present). The authority to make treaties (both the
Constitution and other kinds of treaties) is inherent in the attribute of
sovereignty, which resides in the people.132  Treaties and the
Constitution are ordained by the American people. Federal laws only
implement the Constitution and, sometimes, treaties.133 Therefore,
implementing legislation in pursuance of the Constitution has only a
derivative authority unlike that authority of the Constitution and
other treaties. Also, if the Constitution was to be dissolved, treaties
(but not federal statutes) would continue to bind the United States in
the same way that treaties made by the Articles Congress continue to
bind the United States according to the Supremacy Clause and
international law.1 4 The continuing legally binding authority of
United States treaties upon the United States does not rely upon the
continuing existence of the federal government. However, the
Constitution has authoritative primacy over other treaties because it
was ordained and established by the people of the United States,
whereas other treaties are made through the manner prescribed by
132. Another inherent attribute of sovereignty includes the power to control
immigration. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
133. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("Acts of Congress are the
supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties
are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States. It is open to
question whether the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts
prescribed to make the convention.").
134. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("all Treaties made.., under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land"(emphasis added)); 2 VATrEL, supra
note 6, § 191; PUFENDORF, supra note 83, bk. VIII, ch. ix, § 8 (recognizing successor state
responsibility for complying with treaties entered into by earlier state).
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the Constitution and only derivatively through the people of the
United States.'
Although federal courts subsequently have held that federal
statutes can trump customary international law and earlier treaties,
these precedents are fraught with a litany of insurmountable
problems. In cases where federal courts have held that federal
statutes can supercede earlier ratified treaties, this last-in-time rule is
problematic because of its racist and anti-immigrant etiology,'36 its
incompatibility with multilateral treaties,"' its violation of the
separation of powers principle,'38 its failure to recognize a number of
grounds allowed by the law of nations for states to withdraw from
treaties,'39 and its conflict with the original understanding of the
Framers and early Supreme Court precedent.' ° Indeed, the last-in-
time rule in regard to federal statutes superceding treaties is a
continuation of the Plessy v. Ferguson4' legacy of racist constitutional
construction. The same Supreme Court that embraced a "separate
135. A treaty, strictly speaking, cannot violate the Constitution. Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 15-19 (1957).
136. See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871) (breaking treaty
with Cherokee nation by charging tax on tobacco); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580
(1884) (breaking friendship treaties by charging head tax on entering aliens); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (breaking treaty
with China by excluding Chinese immigrants); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898)
(breaking treaty with Cherokee nation by denying self-government); Stephens v.
Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899) (breaking treaty with Cherokee nation by taking
land); see also Howard Tolley, The Domestic Applicability of International Treaties in the
United States, 17 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 403 (1983).
137. How does one determine whether a multilateral treaty is the last-in-time or not
when the treaty provides for an interstate complaint procedure that creates mutual
obligations between parties? As states become new parties to the multilateral treaty
creating new obligations for the United States vis-a-vis these new states-parties, any prior
legislation is nullified in respect to these new parties. Therefore, the last-in-time rule's
application becomes problematic. See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 41 (interstate complaint
procedure). Also, many multilateral treaties do not allow party withdrawal. General
Comment No. 26, UN Human Rights Committee, 61" Sess., 84 $ 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21[Rev.1/Add.8 (1997) (state-party cannot denounce or withdraw from ICCPR).
138. If the last-in-time rule was valid, Congress alone without the President's approval
could invalidate the treaty by subsequent legislation if the bill received 2/3 of votes from
each House. If such a federal statute violated the law of nations, this would exceed
Congress' limited authority to only "define" offenses against the law of nations and only
make laws that are "necessary and proper."
139. See supra note 131.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 175-85. For a fuller discussion of the last-in-
time rule's insurmountable difficulties in regard to federal statutes superceding treaties,
see MARTIN, CHALLENGING, supra note 9, at 14-17.
141. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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but equal" construction of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause in regard to African-Americans also embraced a
last-in-time rule construction of the Article II treaty clause in regard
to Native-Americans, Chinese and other aliens."" Therefore, the last-
in-time rule has serious constitutional infirmities.
Also, recent federal court practice seems to suggest that federal
statutes and executive orders always. trump customary international
law regardless of when it emerged.' However, this recent rule is also
fraught with insurmountable problems, such as its basis on a
paraphrasing of dicta in the United States Supreme Court's The
Paquete Habana'" that is overreaching,' its failure to recognize
earlier conflicting case law and authorities, ' its absurd results (such
as indefinite detention),"7 its mis-characterization of customary
international law as merely common law that can be superceded by
'48statute, its displacement of customary international law by treaty
142. Compare, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889) ("the
presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful.effect upon the material interests of the state,
and upon public morals; that their immigration was in numbers approaching the character
of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to our civilization"), with Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544
("Laws permitting, and even requiring, [the separation of Whites and Negroes], in places
where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other ....").
143. See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th
Cir. 1996) (federal statute supercedes customary international law); Comm. of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (federal statute
supercedes customary international law); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 964 (5th
Cir. 1986) (federal statute supercedes customary international law); Garcia-Mir v. Meese,
788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir. 1986) (federal statutes and executive orders supercede
customary international law); United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1982)
(federal statute supercedes customary international law); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666
(D.C. Cir. 1959) (federal statute supercedes customary international law).
144. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (dictum) ("where there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort. must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations").
145. For example, some federal courts have overreached the dictum's meaning by
adding the word "only," as in "[oInly 'where there is not treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision,' resort will be made to the customary
international law." In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17 (D. Conn.
1997); see also Dimon-Sainz v. United States, No. 97-3117-RDR, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18582, *5 (D. Kan. 1999) (same); Tag, 267 F.2d at 666 (same).
146. See, e.g., Macintosh v. United States, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931) (dictum) (Congress
under war powers authority cannot violate international law); see also Jordan Paust,
Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law:
Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393
(1988), for additional authorities cited therein.
147. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir,.788 F.2d at 1455 (indefinite detention).
148. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century
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law as a superior authority of law,4 9 and - again - its conflict with the
original understanding of the Founders.' Therefore, this rule has
serious constitutional infirmities.
Finally, like the rest of international law, the Constitution cannot
unilaterally be made by the individual states. The ratifications of nine
states were needed to put the Constitution into force.'"' Amendments
to the Constitution only require the ratifications of three-fourths of
the individual states of the Union. 2 In conclusion, the Constitution
gives international law (including itself) greater legal authority than
other federal, state or common law: This legal hierarchy also reflects
international law. The Constitution's hierarchy of legal authorities is
consonant with the Constitution's status as a treaty.
3. The Original Understanding of the Constitution as Social
Contract Based in International Law & the Application of the
Law of Nations to Domestic Affairs
The original understanding of the Constitution by the Founders
also was conceptually framed in terms of international law. The very
concepts of constitutionalism, federalism, popular sovereignty, social
compact, and natural law had come from international
jurisprudence.'53 Accordingly, the Founders cited many of these
international legal authorities."'
of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) [hereinafter Henkin,
Chinese Exclusion] (disputing customary international law as being only federal common
law).
149. If federal statutes as well as treaties have equal authority - as the last-in-time rule
holds - then treaties trump customary international law. However, this inference violates
international law. See infra Part 4.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 175-85. For a fuller discussion of the last-in-
time rule's insurmountable difficulties in regard to federal statutes and executive orders
superceding customary international law, see MARTIN, CHALLENGING, supra note 9, at
48-55.
151. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
152. U.S. CONST. art. V.
153. See, e.g., Union of Utrecht (1579) (treaty establishing constitutional form of
government); FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, ON THE LAW OF WAR (1557) (popular
sovereignty); HUGO GROTIUS, ON LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. II, ch. XV, 15-16
(1625) (social compact and natural law); PUFENDORF, supra note 83 (natural law); 1
VATIEL, supra note 6, § 10 (federalism) and ch. 3 (constitutions); BURLAMAQUI, supra
note 73, at vol. II, pt. II, ch. VI, § VI (popular sovereignty).
154. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 20 at 12-13 (Hamilton & Madison) (1787)
(citing Grotius and Union of Utrecht); JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (June 27, 1787) (L. Martin citing Vattel); JAMES WILSON, Of the
Law of Nations, in LECTURES IN LAW 6, 8, and 13 (1791) (citing Grotius, Pufendorf,
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Social contract and natural law theory that undergirds the United
States constitutional compact also governs relations between nations.
For social compact theorists, such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke,
individuals existed in a state of nature governed by natural law
expressed through compacts with each other for their self-
governance. 55 International jurisprudence also used social contract
and natural law theory before Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke to
describe and prescribe relations not only between the sovereign and
his subjects but also between nations.156
Before these domestic social compact theorists, Grotius in his ON
LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE (1625) had based both his international
and domestic jurisprudence on social contract and natural law theory.
For Grotius, nations also existed in a state of nature governed by
natural law that was expressed through pacts (i.e., treaties) between
these nations. The reservoir of positive law articulated by these
treaties and expressed by customs practiced by these nations
constituted the jus gentium or the "law of nations." Like the later
social compact theorists, Grotius also recognized that pacts were the
positive law expressions of natural law between individuals existing in
the state of nature.'57 He recognized that there is a necessary identity
and Burlamaqui) [hereinafter WILSON]; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 199, 221 (1796)
(Chase, J., citing Vattel); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
143 (1812) (Marshall, C.J., citing Vattel); THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES §
LII (1812) (citing Vattel).
Between 1789 and 1820, Vattel was cited thirty-eight times in United States Supreme
Court opinions. See FRANCIS STEPHEN RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 284 (1975) (citing Edwin Dickinson's research); see also JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (1878) ("[Vattel's book] has been cited
more freely than that of any other public jurist, and is still the statesman's manual and
oracle."); DANIEL GEORGE LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE
LAW OF NATIONS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 95 (1985) (noting that Hamilton called
Vattel "perhaps the most accurate and approved of the writers on the law of nations.")
(citation omitted); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law,
42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 823 (1989) ("In ascertaining principles of the law of nations,
lawyers and judges [in eighteenth century America] relied heavily on continental treatise
writers, Vattel being the most often consulted.... An essential part of a sound legal
education consisted of reading Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui, among
others.").
155. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (1651); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON THE STATE OF NATURE
(1690).
156. See, e.g., 1 VATTEL, supra note 6, ch. 2 ("General Principles of the Duties of a
Nation towards herself").
157. In his ON LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, Grotius begins his analysis of international
relations and law with a discussion of the relations between individuals.
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between the contractual dynamics of municipal law and international
law because both are governed by the natural law that required the
making of pacts to ensure the long-term preservation of both parties'
self-interest by reciprocal guarantee to the other.
In order to separate positive law from natural law - the "is" from
the "ought"-on the international level, Grotius analyzed the power
dynamics of pacts or treaties between nations, and argued that
"promises should be kept" ("pacta sunt servanda") in order to ensure
that the nations existing in a state of nature do not go to war with
each other and, thereby, violate the very natural law that governs the
state of nature. This contractual paradigm not only explained
relations between nations existing in a state of nature, it also
incorporated moral accountability in those relations by explaining
why such contracts were "necessary" - that is, why such contracts
were consistent with natural law. Such inter-national contracts were
necessary to "safeguard [a nation's] own future peace" because the
absence of treaties or their violation could result in war.
However, the notion of the "law of nations" (in which these
treaty norms were embedded) appears to have become mistakenly
limited to refer only to the law governing relations between nation-
states for some jurists - hence, the modern and somewhat unfortunate
- phrase "inter-national law" emerged. However, jus inter gentes is
only a subset of jus gentium, and the phrase "international law" was
not even coined until 1780 by Jeremy Bentham.5 9 For example, the
lex mercatoria (private international law) was and continues to be a
subset of law that governs commercial transactions between private
individuals.
This definitional change is probably associated with three
[S]ince it is a rule of the law of nature to abide by pacts (for it is necessary that
among men there be some method of obligating themselves one to another, and
no other natural method can be imagined), out of this source the bodies of
municipal law have arisen....
.... [T]he mother of municipal law is that obligation which arises from mutual
consent ....
GROTIUS, supra note 153, at IT 15-16.
158. Id. at T 18. Violation of treaties was casus belli under the old law of nations.
However, present international law generally outlaws war for treaty violations. See, e.g.,
UN Charter, art. 2(4) ("All members shall refrain in the international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
159. JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES AND MORALS OF LEGISLATION, Preface, at Part
the Seventh (1789) ("Principles of legislation in matters betwixt nation and nation, or, to
use a new though not inexpressive appellation, in matters of international law.").
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developments. First, the ideas of "nation" and "state" appear to have
become increasingly conflated with the emergence of the modern
state as a "nation-state," which is generally dated at the end of the
Thirty Years War with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648
and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire into nation-states.' 60
However, strictly speaking, "nations" are peoples, and "states" are
bodies politic. With the emergence of the modern state, the state
became identified increasingly only with the crown because often the
crown was the head of state. As Louis XIV (1643-1715) succinctly put
it, "L'tat c'est Moi." The locus of sovereignty in the nation appears
to have become increasingly displaced by the king through his
identification with the state.
Second, monarchs began to assert the divine right of kings. As
James I put it in his speech to Parliament in 1609:
The state of monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth; for
kings are not only God's lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon
God's throne, but even by God himself are called gods. There
be three principal similitudes that illustrate the state of
monarchy: one taken out of the word of God; and the two other
out of the grounds of policy and philosophy. In the Scriptures
kings are called gods, and so their power after a certain relation
compared to the divine power. Kings are also compared to
fathers of families: for a king is truly Parens patriae, the
politique father of his people. And lastly, kings are compared to
the head of this microcosm of the body of man. 161
Under the divine right of kings, the king was the political head of
his people. The people were not sovereign, and only the king could
make treaties."" Absolute monarchy resulted in the loss of the
peoples' standing in the law of nations.
Third, with the emergence of the modern state, the inter-state
mechanism of making jus gentium through treaties became
increasingly prominent, serving to marginalize the domestic
160. The conceptual vacillation between distinguishing a nation from a state and the
conflation of nation with state is seen in Vattel. Compare, e.g., 1 VATrEL, supra note 6, at
§ 1 ("A NATION or a state is... a body politic") with § 4 ("Every nation that governs
itself, under what form soever, without dependence on any foreign power, is a Sovereign
State.").
161. King James I, On the Divine Right of Kings, 1 (Mar. 21, 1609) (speech to
Parliament).
162. GROTIUS, supra note 153, bk. II, ch. 15, [ 5 ("in monarchies, the power of making
treaties belongs to the king alone").
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dimensions of jus gentium by focusing on state-to-state relations.
Because of these three developments, individuals increasingly
appeared to lose their international standing as well as their domestic
standing in the social contract. With this loss of standing, they often
also lost their rights.
Furthermore, under the incorrect conceptualization of the law of
nations as only a law between nation-states, the king exercising his
divine right of power was not accountable to natural law expressed
domestically through positive law.'63 However, jus gentium had
governed not only relations between peoples but also relations
between governments and the governed. The contractual paradigm
as instantiated by treaties between sovereigns demanded the
application of the natural law, the performance of mutual duties, and
observance of mutual rights. Locke retained the applicability of
social contract and natural law theory to international relations,' but
most importantly, Locke (following Rousseau) also recovered the
contractual paradigm and natural rights theory for establishing the
proper relationship between the sovereign and his subjects.'65
One of the Founders, James Wilson, reiterated these points.
According to Wilson, "[t]he law of nature, when applied to states or
political societies, receives a new name, that of the law of nations."'
66
Using this social contract and natural law theory derived from
international jurisprudence, Wilson recognized that the law of nations
governed not only relations between nations but also relations
between the state and its citizens.
Some seem to have thought, that [the law of nations] respects
and regulates the conduct of nations only in their intercourse
with each other. A very important branch of this law - that
163. King James I, On the Divine Right of Kings, 2 (Mar. 21, 1609) (kings "have
power of raising and casting down, of life and of death, judges over all their subjects and in
all causes and yet accountable to none but God only"). As Hobbes argued, although the
sovereign (i.e., king) could act immorally, the sovereign could not act injustly in the legal
sense. Having experienced the English Civil War (1642-51), Hobbes argued for the
suspension of the domestic legal accountability of the king at the expense of the peoples'
rights in order to facilitate domestic tranquility that seemed to him more securable
through a strong central executive.
164. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, "OF THE STATE OF
NATURE" $ 14 (W. von Leyden ed., Oxford Clarendon Press 1954) (1690) ("all princes
and rulers of independent governments all through the world are in a state of nature").
165. Id. at § 95 ("Men being.., by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can
be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own
consent." ).
166. WILSON, supra note 154, at 1.
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containing the duties which a nation owes itself - seems to have
escaped their attention. "The general principle," says
Burlamaqui, "of the law of nations, is nothing more than the
general law of sociability, which obliges nations to the same
duties as are prescribed to individuals. 67
For the Founding Fathers, the United States' obligations under
the law of nations also imposed duties both towards and upon United
States nationals. For example, in ordering its army and naval forces
as well as privateers to observe the laws of war in their conduct of war
against Great Britain," Congress authorized the capture and
condemnation of ships belonging to United States citizens according
to the law of nations.169  In establishing prize courts, Congress also
recognized the possibility that private Americans might have claims
against United States authorities and privateers who seized their
cargo in violation of the law of nations.'70 The law of nations
governing piracy also protected United States nationals.17 ' The law of
nations also created duties for private Americans vis-a-vis foreign
nationals (such as ambassadors),' and the United States was
responsible for ensuring that private individuals observed this law of
nations because, otherwise, the United States would acquire
liability.7 1 In conclusion, the law of nations always governed relations
167. Id.
168. 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 361 (1912). These instructions
included not to kill, torture, or treat inhumanely persons "contrary to common usage, and
the practice of civilized nations in war." Id. at 363.
169. 21 id. at 1154. Congress also apportioned prizes for sea and land captures by
privateers according to the law of nations. Id. at 1157-58.
170. See id. at 315 (prize courts governed by law of nations) and 364 (privateers
violating laws of nations subject to forfeiture of commission and "liable to an action for
breach of the condition of [privateer's] bond, [and] responsible to the party grieved for
damages sustained by such malversation").
171. See Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 513-14 ("that if any person or persons
whatsoever ever, shall, upon the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the
law of nations, and such offender or offenders shall be brought into, or found in the
United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof,... be
punished with death.").
172. See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1136-1137 (1912)
(recommending states punish law of nations violations, including attacks on ambassadors);
1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795) (foreign nationals have private cause of action against
United States nationals for violation of law of nations or treaty under Alien Tort Statute
(1789), presently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
173. See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1108 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Wilson,
J.) (Charge to Grand Jury) (stating if the nation refused to require its citizens to make
reparation or to punish citizens for committing offenses against law of nations, the nation
"renders itself in some measure an accomplice in the guilt, and becomes responsible for
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between the state and the governed, i.e., domestic affairs.
'14
The Founders did not adhere to an American exceptionalism in
international law and affairs. For example, in response to certain
states of the United States violating the Paris Peace Treaty, the
Articles Congress wrote a letter to Great Britain in 1787 clearly
stating that neither the United States nor its individual states could
violate its obligations under either treaties or the law of nations.
Our national constitution having committed to us the
management of the national concerns with foreign States and
powers, it is our duty to take care that all the rights which they
ought to enjoy within our Jurisdiction by the laws of nations and
the faith of treaties remain inviolate.... For as the Legislature
only which constitutionally passes a law has power to revise and
amend it, so the sovereigns only who are parties to the treaty
have power, by mutual consent and posterior Articles to correct
or explain it.... As the treaty of peace so far as it respects the
matters and things provided for in it, is a Law to the United
States, which cannot by all or any of [the United States] be
altered or changed,....
The Founders' belief that the United States' international legal
obligations could not be violated by either the federal government or
the individual states was not limited to the government under the
Articles of Confederation but also extended to the Constitution.176 In
Federalist Number sixty four, Jay stated:
They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal
them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties
may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties
are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by
both; and consequently, that as the consent of both was
the injury").
174. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) ("International law, in its widest and
most comprehensive sense - including not only questions of right between nations,
governed by what has been appropriately called the law of nations but also...what is
usually called private international law... and concerning the rights of persons within the
territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the
dominion of another nation - is part of our law.").
175. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 177, 177-81 (1912) (letter to
Great Britain dated Apr. 13, 1787).
176. Madison stated that "[tihe powers relating to...treaties... are all vested in the
existing Congress by the Articles of Confederation. The proposed change [by the
Constitution] does not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of
administering them." THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at s 11 (James Madison) (1788).
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essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be
to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore,
has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are
just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of
legislative acts now, as they will be at any future period, or
under any form of government.177
177. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 12 (John Jay) (1788). During the North Carolina
Constitutional Convention, William Davie stated, "although treaties are mere
conventional acts between the contracting parties, yet, by the law of nations, they are the
supreme law of the land to their respective citizens or subjects. All civilized nations have
concurred in considering them as paramount to an ordinary act of legislation." ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 52, at 119 (July 28, 1788). Hamilton later would write that it was
"understood by all" during the Constitutional Convention that the Constitution's treaty
power was "competent to... controul and bind the legislative power of Congress" and
that "no objection was made to the idea of its controuling future exercises of the
legislative power." Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. 38 (1795), in 20 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 22,25 n.* (H. Syrett ed., 1974).
In 1791, James Wilson argued that the reason for why a nation could not violate its
treaties with other nations was because such a violation was a disservice to the nation's
own members:
When men have formed themselves into a state or nation, they may reciprocally
enter into particular engagements, and, in this manner, contract new obligations
in favour of the members of the community; but they cannot, by this union,
discharge themselves from any duties which they previously owed to those, who
form no part of the union. They continue under all the obligations required by
the universal society of the human race - the great society of nations. The law of
that great and universal society requires, that each nation should contribute to
the perfection and happiness of the others. It is, therefore, a duty which every
nation owes to itself, to acquire those qualifications, which will fit and enable it to
discharge those duties which it owes to others.
WILSON, supra note 154, at 32.
During the Jay Treaty controversy five years later, United States Supreme Court
Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth wrote that "a Treaty cannot be repealed or annulled by
Statute because it is a compact with a foreign power, and one party to a compact cannot
dissolve it without the consent of the other." William Casto, Two Advisory Opinions, 6
GREENBAG 414 (2003) (letter dated Mar. 13, 1796 to John Trumbull); see ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 479, 4'h Cong. 2"d Sess. (Mar. 1796) (Roger Griswold: treaty superior to
Congressional act and, consequently, treaty provision cannot be repealed by mere
Congressional act). However, also during the Jay Treaty controversy, Treasury Secretary
Oliver Wolcott opined that Congress lawfully could enact a law to "repeal" an earlier
treaty, but it is important to note that Wolcott used the example of a Congressional
declaration of war "repealing" an earlier treaty. 1 OLIVER WOLCOTT, MEMOIRS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND JOHN ADAMS 1796 (1846). Wolcott was
effectively correct. As noted above, under the law of nations, a state lawfully could
"terminate" (not "repeal") a treaty on the grounds that another state had violated either
its treaty or customary international legal obligations with the first state. Violations of
treaty or customary international legal obligations could be sufficient grounds under the
law of nations for waging war. See supra notes 56-57 and 158. Madison during the Jay
Treaty controversy staked out a middle ground that created a dilemma. He argued that
federal statutes could not violate treaties, but he also argued that treaties could not violate
federal statutes. ANNALS OF CONGRESS 479, 4' Cong. 2"' Sess. (Mar. 1796).
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However, Thomas Jefferson later wrote that legislative acts
constitutionally could violate treaties.178 In this regard, it is important
to note that Jefferson was not a Framer. He was in France during the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution, and his understanding of
the Constitution was flawed. Furthermore, Jefferson contradicted
himself because he had indicated that the Constitution was a treaty
and that federal legislation lawfully could not violate it.179
The Supreme Court a few years later would state that "[w]hen
the United States declared their independence, they were bound to
receive the law of nations.""' "[Tihe United States by taking a place
among the nations of the earth [became] amenable to the law of
nations."'' 1 Most importantly, the United States Supreme Court in
1812 held that civilized nations could not violate treaties. In The
Antelope, the Court stated the following:
In almost every instance, the treaties between civilized nations
contain a stipulation to this effect in favor of vessels driven in
by stress of weather or other urgent necessity. In such cases the
sovereign is bound by compact to authorize foreign vessels to
enter his ports. The treaty binds him to allow vessels in distress
to find refuge and asylum in his ports, and this is a license which
he is not at liberty to retract.' 2
It was clear that the United States government could not violate
178. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE
USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES § LII (1812) ("Treaties being declared,
equally with the laws of the United States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is
understood that an act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed and
rescinded.").
179. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Everett (Apr. 8, 1826), in THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 151 (E. Dumbauld ed., 1955)
(Constitution is a compact between independent nations); Kentucky Resolution at 1
(1799) (drafted by Jefferson), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/kenres.htm
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (stating that federal Alien and Sedition Acts were
unconstitutional).
180. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796); see also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 27
(1792), reprinted in 1 OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 27 (Dennis & Co., Inc.
1945) ("The law of nations, although not specifically adopted by the Constitution or any
municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land."). It was hardly controversial to
American jurists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the law of nations was
United States law - regardless of Article III's failure to explicitly mention it. See Stewart
Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819
(1989).
181. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
182. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 141 (1812) (emphasis added).
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either the law of nations or its treaties. When the United States in its
early years did stop complying with its treaty obligations, it did so
because its treaty partner had breached the treaty 3 or the treaty itself
allowed termination;" treaty breach by one of its parties or unilateral
withdrawal per a treaty's provisions is sufficient ground to void a
treaty under the law of nations.'
This only made sense because the Founders ascribed to social
compact and natural law theory that was based in international
jurisprudence.' 86  The normative paradigm of covenant laid the
foundation for the Founders' political, legal, and moral worlds. The
Founders saw covenants (such as treaties, social compacts or
constitutions) as means of enabling peoples to articulate natural and
inalienable rights as well as to secure these rights for themselves by
way of other peoples through the reciprocity inherent in these
contractual mechanisms." These covenants gave corporeal
expression and definition to natural rights and duties, and these rights
and duties, in turn, became embedded in, reflected in, and guaranteed
by the law of nations - a global reservoir of natural rights and duties
that applied to both international and domestic affairs. Contracts
were the sinews of the body politic. Break the contract and you
hamstring the nation and states.
In conclusion, there should be no doubt that the Constitution is a
federal treaty. The Constitution's text denotes it as a treaty,
addresses international legal subjects, and incorporates international
legal norms. The Founders - Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike - as
183. See, e.g., An Act to Declare the Treaties Heretofore Concluded with France, no
Longer Obligatory on the United States, 1 Stat. 578 (1798) (repeated treaty violations by
France and French failure to compensate for violations justifies United States voiding of
treaties).
184. For example, President Polk in 1846 requested that Congress approve his
authority to withdraw from the Oregon Territory Treaty (1827) with Great Britain and
notify the British government of the United States' withdrawal per the Treaty's terms.
Congress did so in Joint Resolution of April 27,1846, 9 Stat. 109-110 (1846).
185. 2 VATrEL, supra note 6, § 202 (breach); Vienna Convention, arts. 42 (2)
(withdrawal according to treaty provisions) and 60 (breach).
186. But see Robert Anderson IV, "Ascertained in a Different Way": The Treaty Power
at the Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 G.W. L. REV. 189, 214 et
passim (2001) (distinguishing treaties from compacts on the basis that the latter created
communities whereas the former were merely contracts). However, as demonstrated in
the aforementioned discussion, a treaty also can create a community or nation. Indeed,
treaties serve to establish a community of nations.
187. These contractual mechanisms also provided the necessary restraint on unilateral,
unbridled assertion of an arguably unlimited number of rights, which historically has been
a practical operational problem with the concept of natural law.
I ........
lVol 31:3
well as early 19th century states' rights advocates recognized the
Constitution as a treaty. The Framers were acutely aware that they
had to ensure that the ratification of the Constitution did not violate
the law of nations governing treaties and that the Constitution itself
did not violate the law of nations. The social contract theoretical
foundations of the Constitution reflected international jurisprudence.
In light of all of this, it is difficult to see how the Constitution is not a
federal treaty. Indeed, there is nothing in the Constitution's text or
its original public understanding that indicates that the Constitution is
not a treaty. Recognizing the Constitution as a federal treaty may
require a conceptual paradigm shift for most constitutional lawyers.
However, such shifts are not unknown to our history of constitutional
jurisprudence.
4. Why Must the Constitution Be Construed in Conformity
with the United States' Customary International Legal
Obligations?
Why should we go further and conclude that our federal
Constitution must be construed according to the United States'
customary international legal obligations? From an originalist
viewpoint, the Founders believed that the Constitution must be
construed in conformity with the law of nations, of which customary
international law constituted a substantial proportion. From an
international law perspective, the simple answer is that treaties (such
as the Constitution) generally must be construed in conformity with
the law of nations. Treaties as international legal instruments must be
first construed in conformity with the other laws suitable to its genre,
namely, the law of nations. As numerous international courts and
tribunals have held, "an international instrument must be interpreted
and applied within the overall framework of the [international]
juridical system in force at the time of the interpretation."'89 Treaties
188. See supra text accompanying note 74 (statement by Randolph).
189. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (1971); Interpretation of the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Ser. A,
No. 10, at 37 (1989); Coard v. United States, Inter-Am. Cm. H.R., No. 109/99 at 40
(1999), available at
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/UnitedStatesO.95l.htm> (last visited
Feb. 15, 2003); see also Vienna Convention, art. 31(3)(c) (treaty must be interpreted in
light of "any rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties");
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generally cannot violate extant customary international legal norms
binding on a treaty's parties for a couple of reasons. First, to violate a
customary international legal norm by implementing a conflicting
treaty norm is to violate the principle of pacta sunt servanda that
establishes the basis for most of international law - whether treaty
law or customary international law that is reflected by treaties. One
cannot say that s/he promises to abide by a certain norm and
subsequently promise to abide by a conflicting norm because the later
promise is not credible. Second, implementing a treaty norm that
conflicts with a customary international legal norm would result in the
unraveling of the international legal order through a "domino-effect"
Vienna Convention-SlO, art. 31(3)(c) (treaty between intergovernmental organization and
state must be interpreted in light of "any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties"). Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (meaning
of treaty language "to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law
of nations").
As the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion notes, a treaty must be
interpreted according to present customary international law - not outdated customary
international law in force at the time the treaty came into force. If a treaty were to be
construed in conformity with customary international legal norms present at the time of
the treaty coming into force but that were no longer valid, the treaty may conflict with the
state's present international legal obligations not only with other states but with its treaty
partner. Cf. Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, at §§ 56-57
(1994) (recognizing that 1762 Netherlands-Saramaka treaty allowing sale of slaves - which
had been protected by contemporary customary international law - "would be today null
and void" because treaty violates present'jus cogens).
Furthermore, a treaty cannot be construed in conformity only with those customary
international legal norms that existed at the time of a treaty coming into force (and which
are still valid) because a treaty must be interpreted and applied within the "overall
framework" of international law, according to the International Court of Justice's advisory
opinion. If a treaty were to be construed only in conformity with the customary
international law existing at the time of the treaty entering into force, the implementation
of the treaty may violate present customary international legal norms with not only other
states but also with the original treaty partner. Therefore, the Constitution as a treaty
cannot be construed in conformity with outdated invalid customary international legal
norms or only in conformity with those customary international legal norms that were
recognized by the Framers in 1789 and persist today.
In the context of federal statutory law, Judge Robert Bork has argued that violations
of international law over which the Alien Tort Statute provides jurisdiction should be
limited to only those international legal violations recognized in 1789, the date of the
Alien Tort Statute's enactment. Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J. concurring). If this were to be the case, an alien today seeking compensation for
the loss of his slaves freed in another country would have a colorable claim covered by the
Alien Tort Statute because the law of nations protected slavery in 1789. See The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (law of nations protects slavery); 3 VA-rrEL,
supra note 6, § 152 (law of nations allows enslavement of prisoners of war). Indeed, one of
the first reported cases that addressed the Alien Tort Statute involved this very issue. See
Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C.1795) (No. 1607) (suit for restitution for loss of
slaves available under Alien Tort Statute).
i ........
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of state withdrawals from their customary international legal
obligations with the violating states."' The only exception to this
general rule of international law is when the norm is of a human
rights or humanitarian nature because such norms transcend the
inter-state dimensions of international law."'
Another, more theoretical answer to why the Constitution must
be construed in conformity with the law of nations is that in
recognizing the validity of the very social contract that authorizes the
federal government to govern the American people - namely, our
Constitution - we are logically committed to recognizing that the
federal government cannot violate our reciprocal arrangements with
other nations that is embedded in the law of nations. To allow the
federal government to commit such violations would allow these
other nation-states, in turn, to violate our rights recognized by these
treaties and customary international law. Construing our
Constitution to allow that such international rights lawfully could be
violated would make our Constitution a "suicide pact" in so far as our
rights are concerned.'" By violating our treaty and customary
international legal obligations, the federal government violates its
social compact with its own people by placing their rights at peril.
Recall that some of the complaints in the Declaration of
Independence that justified the American people "dissolving" the
social contract with the British government was the British
government's violation of rights possessed not only by the American
people but also by foreign peoples that were guaranteed by the law of
nations, such as those involving freedom of trade and the seas.9  To
put it another way, the Brits broke brith not only with the American
people but also with foreign peoples.
190. However, a state lawfully can enter into a new multilateral treaty that abrogates a
customary international legal norm, assuming a sufficient number of states agree to this
new treaty.
191. See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3 at 8 (1997) ("Although treaties that are mere exchanges of
obligations between States allow them to reserve inter se applications of rules of general
international law, it is otherwise in human rights treaties, which are for the benefit of
persons within their jurisdiction .... "); Vienna Convention, art. 60 (5) (termination or
suspension of humanitarian treaty not justified by breach).
192. See Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 282 (1914) ("It is also settled beyond
dispute that the Constitution is not self-destructive.").
193. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE at 3 ("For cutting off our Trade with all
parts of the world.... He has plundered our seas."). The law of nations guarantees
freedom of trade and the seas. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, OF THE FREEDOM OF THE
SEAS ch. 12 (1609).
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Furthermore, international lawmaking can be more
advantageous to the American people than the Congressional
lawmaking or amendment making mechanisms. International
lawmaking allows both the articulation and recognition of rights that
otherwise would be unavailable under the Congressional lawmaking
or amendment making mechanisms because such rights require
acceptance from foreign states for their observance.'9" Such rights
include (but are necessarily restricted to) those having an
extraterritorial extension in other countries or in international spaces.
Although the Congressional lawmaking and amendment lawmaking
mechanisms can articulate such rights, the recognition of those rights
often necessarily relies upon other foreign states for their
enforcement in the territories of these states and in international
spaces.
Furthermore, unlike most of the Constitution's rights protections
(as presently construed),1  international law can be more
advantageous to the American people because it often creates
affirmative state duties for protecting fundamental individual rights. '9
Also, attempts through the State Commerce Clause and the
penumbras of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to recognize
other fundamental rights (such as workers' and privacy rights) are
controversial because of their loose constructions of the Constitution.
Hence, such attempts often fail.' 7  However, international law
194. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("It is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could
not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could .... ")
195. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (habeas corpus, bills of attainder and ex post facto),
Amendments I (speech, assembly, press), II (bear arms), III (quartering of soldiers), IV
(unreasonable searches and seizures), V (grand jury indictment, double jeopardy, self-
incrimination, due process), XIII (slavery), XIV (citizenship, immunities, equal
protection), XV (race discrimination in voting), XIX (sex discrimination in voting), and
XXIV (inability to pay poll tax does not disenfranchise). Only Amendment VI (right to a
fair trial) and VII (right to jury civil trial) create governmental affirmative duties.
196. See, e.g., Veldsquez Rodrfguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ser. C., No. 4 at
172 (1988) (state affirmative duty to prevent right to life, humane treatment, and liberty
violations committed by private or state actor), Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 E.H.R.R.
245 (2000) (affirmative state duty to prevent right to life violations committed by private
actor); A. v. United Kingdom, 27 E.H.R.R. 611 (.1999) (affirmative state duty to prevent
right to humane treatment violations committed by private actor).
197. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (protection of
state government workers' rights through minimum wage law not authorized by Interstate
Commerce Clause); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (no privacy right to engage
in homosexual conduct under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments), rev'd in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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guarantees such fundamental rights. 98  Construing the State
Commerce Clause, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments in
conformity with the United States' international legal obligations
ensures the protection of such rights. Indeed, for Ninth Amendment
construction, the use of the law of nations is especially appropriate,
given that this law protects the fundamental rights of nations, i.e.,
peoples, such as those shared by the American people that cannot be
denied or disparaged by the enumeration of other rights in the
Constitution.'9"
On the other hand, what if the President and Senate make a
treaty that undermines these international rights? For example, what
if the treaty eroded individual human rights at the expense of securing
corporate trade advantages that harmed the natural environment in
which the American people lived? The solution to this problem is
found on the international law level. As John Jay noted in Federalist
No. 64, such a treaty "would be null and void by the law of nations. ' ' o
Furthermore, international law creates a hierarchy of norms on top of
which sit jus cogens norms that are strongly identified with
fundamental human rights norms, such as the rights to life, humane
treatment, liberty, and non-discrimination (among others).20 Such jus
cogens norms invalidate provisions of treaties that conflict with these
norms." Even those human rights norms that do not reflect juscogens still can trump provisions of treaties that violate human rights
198. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), art. 23 (3), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) ("right to just and favourable remuneration
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity") [hereinafter
UDHR]; Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, UN Hum. Rts. Ctte., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488 (1994) (right to privacy includes right to engage in homosexual
conduct under ICCPR).
199. MARTIN, CHALLENGING, supra note 9, at 64-65; Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights
and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975).
200. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (Jay) at 14 (1788) (treaty obtained through corruption
would "be null and void by the law of nations"); see also, VATrEL, 2 LAW OF NATIONS,
supra note 6, § 170:
If the assistance and offices that are due by virtue of such a treaty should on any
occasion prove incompatible with the duties a nation owes to herself, or with
what the sovereign owes to his own nation, the case is tacitly and necessarily
excepted in the treaty. For, neither the nation nor the sovereign could enter into
an engagement to neglect the care of their own safety, or the safety of the state,
in order to contribute to that of their ally.
201. Jus cogens norms are non-derogable, peremptory norms. Vienna Convention, art.
53; see Francisco Forrest Martin, Delineating a Hierarchical Outline of International Law
Sources and Norms, 65(2) SASK. L. REV. 333 (2002) (listing jus cogens norms) [hereinafter
Martin, Delineating].
202. Vienna Convention, art. 53 (us cogens norms trump treaties).
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because many human rights norms have derivative jus cogens status
by virtue of the fact that their observance is essential for the
protection of jus cogens norms."3 Although the Constitution does not
guarantee jus cogens norms as such, treaties can and do.2
Another reason why the Constitution as a treaty must be
construed with the law of nations is because the contemporary
conventional customary international law is often more specific than
the general language of the Constitution. Both international and
domestic laws require that specific law prevail over general law.205
The Constitution contains many vague provisions that require further
definition that can be found in modern customary international law.°6
Finally, construing,, the Constitution in conformity with
customary international law accommodates the Constitution per se.
Customary international law recognizes that a treaty (such as the
Constitution) must be construed according to the ordinary meaning of
the treaty's terms in their context, and that the context must be
construed in conformity with "any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties" (i.e., the states of the
Union)?0 Indeed, one correctly can say that general rules of
constitutional construction represent general rules of regional (i.e.,
American) international law because of the Constitution's status as a
regional inter-state treaty.2 s However, a global (or more widely
accepted regional) rule generally would trump such regional rules for
a couple of reasons. First, as discussed above, violating the global (or
more widely accepted regional) rule would dismantle the larger
international legal order.'l Second, the global (or more widely
203. Martin, Delineating, supra note 201, at 348-53.
204. See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 4 (listing non-derogable, peremptory norms).
205. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. 341 (1996) (lex specialis derogat generali); Powerline Industries Corp. v. Klockner
Moeller Corp., 202 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2000) (same).
206. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, arts. 31 (3)(c) and 43 (recognizing other
international legal rules).
207. Vienna Convention, art. 31 (1). Consistent with this international law principle,
the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has held that international law governs the
relations between states of the Union. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 310 U.S. 563; 570 (1940);
Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. 455, 461 (1935); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S.
660, 670 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902).
208. Furthermore, federal legislation implementing the Constitution also would be
regional international law, but on a lower order of authority because such legislation's
authority is only derivative of the Constitution.
209. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, Case No. IT-97-24-AR73, Int'l Crim. Trib.,
Appeals Chamber (29 May 1998) (customary international legal principle governing
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accepted regional) rule Often has a better pedigree because more
states have observed the rule, thereby providing stronger evidence of
its objective normativity. This is especially true if such a rule reflects
a new customary international law norm or jus cogens because such a
rule respectively would replace or supercede the constitutional
regional rule.1
Although the present text of Constitution does not necessarily
conflict with the United States' customary international legal
obligations, some United States courts have construed certain
constitutional provisions effectively to allow for violations of
customary international legal and jus cogens norms that emerged
after the ratifications of the Constitution and its Amendments.
Therefore, these judicial constructions are unconstitutional because
the relevant constitutional provisions were not construed in
conformity with the United States' customary international legal or
jus cogens obligations."' It is important to note that although certain
arrangements with supernational body trumps customary international law governing
relations only between states); cf UN Charter, art. 103 (obligations under global UN
Charter prevails over any other treaty obligation).
210. Vienna Convention, art. 53 ('us cogens trumps treaty); see Martin, Delineating,
supra note 201, at 352, 359, 362-63 (discussing greater normative objectivity of global
norms).
211. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June
8,1977, art. 47,16 I.L.M. 1391 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1979) (prohibiting mercenaries);
Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25, and 8 of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/97, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)
No. 9 (1987) (habeas corpus cannot be suspended during national emergencies);
Statehood Solidarity Committee v. United States, Case 11.204, Report No. 98/03, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at xx (2003) (denial of District of
Columbia residents right to vote in congressional elections violative of right to vote
guaranteed under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man).
Another example is of juvenile executions. The United States Supreme Court has
held that the execution of persons committing capital crimes under the age of eighteen is
not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
Customary international law and jus cogens prohibit such executions. See, e.g., ICCPR, art.
6 (5); Pinkerton and Roach v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. No. 3/87, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 1986-87,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71/doc.9 147 (1987) (execution of persons committing capital crimes
under the age of 18 held violative of jus cogens). Although the United States deposited a
reservation to the ICCPR stating that it could impose capital punishment on persons
committing crimes below the age of eighteen, the reservation was not valid because it
violated extant customary international law and jus cogens. Issues relating to Reservations
Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto,
or in relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant: 04/11/94, General
Comment 24, 52d Sess., TT 8 and 10, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/rev.1, add.6 (1994) ("provisions
in the Covenant that represent customary international law.. .may not be the subject of
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textual provisions in the Constitution arguably may violate present
customary international law in general, those textual provisions can
be considered evidence of the United States' persistent objection to
those norms when they were emerging;*hence the United States is not
bound by these new customary international legal norms. For
example, the constitutional authority to issue letters of marque and
reprisal (art. I, § 8, cl. 11), to suspend the writ of habeas corpus (art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2), and to effectively deny United States citizens residing in the
District of Columbia the right to elect representatives to the House
and Senate (art. I, § 8, cl. 17) represent persistent objections to norms
that subsequently may have emerged as customary international law.
However, customary international law often will be silent on a
particular issue, providing no lex specialis to apply. In such cases, the
already existing, substantial body of constitutional jurisprudence will
fill the vacuum, and it is only appropriate that it should because this
jurisprudence is also international law, albeit only a regional
American international law.
5. Three Mysteries of Constitutional Faith and the Primacy of
Customary International Law for Constitutional Construction.
Such regional American international law has developed general
principles of constitutional construction - such as federalism,
separation of powers, and "the living Constitution." Theories of
constitutional construction that rely upon the "living Constitution"
principle use extra-constitutional authorities that are often far
removed from period of the Constitution's drafting because in order
for the Constitution to be "living" it must be construed using modern
sociological, political, and/or moral authorities in order to ensure its
adaptation to current social, legal, and political conditions, and/or to
be morally responsive.212 Theories of constitutional construction that
reservations" and state-party bears "heavy onus" in justifying reservation to peremptory
treaty norm). Furthermore, the reservation was deposited too late because the customary
international law norm that Article 6 (5) reflects already had emerged. MARTIN,
CHALLENGING, supra note 9, at 153. Therefore, such executions are unconstitutional
because they conflict with the United States' customary international legal obligations.
212. Such theorists generally are associated with the loose-constructionist schools of
legal realism (and its sub-genre of critical legal studies), and moralist or naturalist theories.
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (arguing that three
great transformative movements of constitutional law and politics (called "constitutional
moments") were characterized by legal creativity bordering on illegality but were
authentic response to political crises and eventually legitimized by American people);
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996) (arguing for moral reading of Constitution and criticizing strict
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predominantly rely upon the principles of federalism and separation
of powers use extra-constitutional authorities more closely associated
with the period of the Constitution's framing because federalism and
separation of powers are issues that deeply concerned the Founding
generation and accordingly are reflected in the Constitution's text and
structure.213
These general principles are plastic allowing adaptability to new
situations and, thereby maintaining the Constitution's viability.
However, such plasticity often allows judges to make law often in an
arguably arbitrary, case-by-case fashion according to their personal
social or political predilections with little democratic accountability.
On the other hand, contemporary customary international law is less
plastic because most of it is codified in multilateral treaties. This law
accommodates these general principles as well as provides greater
determinacy often resolving dilemmas and controversies associated
with the use of these general principles. Also, this modern customary
international law generally has been developed through the
democratically accountable branches of governments - including the
United States.' 214  For these reasons, the law of nations acquires
historical reading of Constitution); SANFORD V. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
(1988) (arguing for critical legal studies interpretation of Constitution); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1996) (deciding
cases by reasoning from precedent rather than by appealing to constitutional text).
However, some of these theorists increasingly identify themselves with the originalist
camp. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
213. Such theorists generally are associated with the strict-constructionist schools of
textualism and originalism. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 4
(1997) (Constitution's text mandates separation of powers and federalism); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104, 116-79 (1980) (arguing for construction of
open-ended constitutional provisions with predominant, textually-based values of
procedural fairness and representative democracy); Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) (original understanding
of constitutional text derived from, e.g., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, debates from the
Constitutional Convention and state constitutional convention); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 INDIANA L. J. 10 (1971) (Constitution
should be construed according to original understanding of Constitution derived from
Constitution's text, structure, and history). These schools often reject an evolving
construction of the Constitution. However, some members of these schools increasingly
are recognizing that meaning of constitutional provisions should be evolving. See, e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (embracing
"faint-hearted originalism" with a "trace of constitutional perfectionism").
214. Furthermore, the substantive norms of international law demand democratic
accountability. See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 25 (right to vote and elect representatives); ACHR,
art. 23 (same). Furthermore, individual rights guarantees in international human rights
law often may only be limited if "necessary in a democratic society." ICCPR, art. 22 (2)
(right to association); ACHR, art. 16 (2) (same); see also ECHR, art. 10 (2) (right to
freedom of expression). Finally, in applying international law, the Statute of the
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primacy over such general principles for constitutional construction.
To claim that the Constitution is viable commits one to a belief in
three mysteries of constitutional faith whose resolutions often are
only obtainable by placing primacy on modern customary
international law for construing the Constitution. In the following
illustrations, we examine how using customary international law often
resolves and transcends these three mysteries: federalism as koan,
separation of powers as trimurti, and "the living Constitution" as
eschaton.
5.1 The "Living Constitution" as Eschaton
A general principle of Constitutional construction is the "living
Constitution" principle."5 It is a mystery of Constitutional faith
because it paradoxically incorporates both the fulfillment and
evolution of the Constitutional covenant by creating and sustaining
the American body politic. However, like the meaning of eschaton in
Christianity, the meaning of the "living Constitution" is subject to
debate.216  Were the meanings of the Constitution and its
Amendments perfected at their respective ratifications, or is the
Constitution's and Amendments' meanings evolving?
For example, the "evolving standards" test articulated by Trop v.
Dulles for Eighth Amendment cases under the "living Constitution"
principle has been especially criticized for its apparent indeterminacy
and sometime reliance upon international law.217 Mr. Justice Scalia
has argued that the evolving standards doctrine is indeterminate. The
doctrine allows the Constitution to become a "sort of an empty bottle
that contains the aspirations of the society, just all sorts of wonderful
aspirations, the precise content of which is quite indeterminate."2"8
However, an evolving standards doctrine based on modern
customary international law is not indeterminate because most
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1005, T.S. 993, places
politically non-accountable judicial decisions in the subordinate position of being only a
subsidiary means of interpretation.
215. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("we must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding").
216. When Christ said, "the kingdom of God is at hand," did he mean that it was
coming or already had come? Mark 1:15 (King James Version). Was the eschaton the
resurrection of Christ, or will the eschaton take place in the future?
217. See 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency.").
218. Antonin Scalia, "A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation," remarks delivered
at The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. Oct. 18, 1996, available at
http://courttv.com/legaldocs/rights/scalia.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
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principles of customary international law have been codified in
multilateral treaties. This conventional customary international law is
comprehensive and specific, discouraging rule plasticity and
indeterminacy. For example, in the case of the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment," the rights to life and
humane treatment under international human rights law has
articulated specific prohibitions, including prohibitions against
juvenile executions and execution by gas asphyxiation.219 Recently,
the Missouri Supreme Court has held that the execution of persons
committing capital crimes under the age of eighteen violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment"
as considered in light of international opinion, citing the Convention
on the Rights of the Child. "0
Furthermore, an evolving standards doctrine based on
conventional customary international law incorporates and
complements principles of evolutionary development.22 For example,
the ECHR reflects customary international law z2 and democratic
accountability23 while at the same time guaranteeing that individual
rights are not eroded by tyrannical popular majorities exercising
219. ICCPR, art 6 (5) (prohibiting death penalty for persons committing crimes under
age of eighteen); Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, UN Hum. Rts. Ctte., 98
I.L.R. 479 (1993) (execution by gas asphyxiation violative of right to humane treatment).
The United States is a party to the ICCPR. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH
THE SECRETARY GENERAL: STATUS AS OF 31 DEC. 1992, at 132, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/11 (1993) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
220. See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W. 397, 411 (2003 Mo.), cert. granted,
124 S.Ct. 1117 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004). ("We also find of note that the views of the
international community have consistently grown in opposition to the death penalty for
juveniles. Article 37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and
several other international treaties and agreements expressly prohibit the practice.").
221. See Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, Application No. 52207/99 (2001)
(discussing evolutive technique for interpreting European Convention on Human Rights);
Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint in the European Court of Human
Rights, 11 HUM. RTS. L. J. 57 (1990) ("The function of the [ECHR], like that of the
American Constitution.. .is 'to provide a continuing framework.. .for the unremitting
protection of individual rights and liberties.' This special purpose and object, and thus the
intention of the drafters, would be largely defeated if the Court could not interpret the
[ECHR] in the light of present-day conditions.").
222. See Rodriguez Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 1980)
(ECHR "indicative of the customs and usages of civilized nations"); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 6, at 103 (2) (a) comment b; Francisco Forrest Martin, Using International Human
Rights Law for Establishing a Unified Use of Force Rule in the Law of Armed Conflict,
64(2) SASK. L. REv. 347, 388-91 (2001) (ECHR reflects global customary international
law).
223. See supra note 214.
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legislative power."'
The "evolving standards" doctrine also has been criticized when
international legal standards are used. In Atkins v. Virginia, Mr.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued against the plurality Court's reliance
on international laws in Trop because the Court offered no
justification for such reliance. He argued that the "bare citation of
international laws by the Trop plurality as authority to deem other
countries' sentencing choices germane" was invalid because "the
viewpoints of other countries simply [were] not relevant" for
establishing evidence of a national consensus regarding sentencing
practices for the United States."'
However, Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to have
misunderstood how the Trop Court's citation of the sentencing
practices of other nations and international law should have
functioned. The sentencing practices of other nations in their
domestic laws and treaties serve as evidence of customary
international law. Such customary international law was not
necessarily merely foreign law. Such law effectively reflected the
United States' customary international legal obligations, with which
the Eighth Amendment should have been construed in conformity. 6
Furthermore, the inherent evolving nature of customary
international law accommodates the "living Constitution" principle
and, more specifically, the evolving standards test. As early as 1796,
the United States Supreme Court recognized the evolving nature of
the law of nations. 7 It is important to note that much of the law of
nations is mutable. Only what Vattel calls the "necessary law of
nations" is immutable because of its identification with natural law.2
224. See ECHR, art. 60 ("Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be
ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to
which it is a party."); see also ICCPR, art. 5 (2) ("There shall be no restriction upon or
derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State
Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the
pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them
to a lesser extent.").
225. 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
226. The United States did not signal its objection to the customary international legal
norm prohibiting the execution of juveniles reflected in the ICCPR until 1992 - after the
norm already had emerged and been accepted by the United States. MARTIN,
CHALLENGING, supra note 9, at 152.
227. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (distinguishing between ancient and
modern law of nations).
228. VATrEL, supra note 6, Preliminaries, at § 8 ("Since therefore the necessary law of
nations consists in the application of the law of nature to states, which law is immutable,
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Later, the United States court of appeals in Fildrtiga v. Peha-Irala22 9
incorporated this understanding by rejecting the lower district court's
claim that customary international law did not extend to a state's
treatment of its own nationals on the basis that this claim was
outdated customary international law."3
Therefore, the Constitution is an "eschatological" instrument
whose meaning is both determinate and evolving if it is construed
according to modern customary international law. The customary
dichotomization of originalism and the "living Constitution" concept
collapses when one recognizes that the Founders viewed the
Constitution as a treaty that must be construed in conformity with
customary international law that itself was evolving.
5.2 Separation of Powers as Trimurti
Another general principle of constitutional construction is the
separation of powers principle. It holds that the three branches of the
federal government cannot usurp the respective powers of another
branch nor surrender their respectively exclusive powers to another
branch."' Associated with this general principle is the execution
doctrine.32  However, this principle creates a constitutional
conundrum - another mystery of constitutional faith. For example,
how can the separation of powers principle allow constitutional
amendments, treaties, or statutes be created yet not sustained
sometimes as self-executing? One is reminded of the Hindu mystery
of trimurti: the tripartite personality yet unitary substance of God.
How can God create, sustain, and destroy at the same time?23
as being founded on the nature of things, and particularly on the nature of man, - it
follows that the Necessary law of nations is immutable." (emphases in original)); see also
BURLAMAQUI, supra note 73, vol. I, pt. II, ch. VI, § IX (1748) (one kind of law of nations
is "universal, necessary, and self-obligatory - and differs in nothing from the law of
nature, and is consequently immutable").
229. 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
230. Furthermore, the district court was incorrect in claiming that customary
international law did not create duties for a state to protect its own nationals. See supra
Part 3.
231. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (statute allowing line-
item veto held unconstitutional as violation of separation of powers principle).
232. Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695, 717 (1995) [hereinafter Vizquez, Four Doctrines]. However, the execution
doctrine is not necessarily a separation of powers doctrine. Legal instruments - whether
United States, foreign, or international - often require implementing law to give the
instrument effect.
233. The trimurti is the Hindu trinity of gods consisting of Brahma the creator, Vishnu
the preserver, and Shiva the destroyer. A theological parallel is that of the Christian
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A treaty, constitutional provision, or statute sometimes requires
an additional law (such as a statute, executive or administrative
agency order, or judicial order) in order to give the instrument effect
because the instrument needs further definition.' Sometimes a
statute is needed to provide a private cause of action for the violation
of a constitutional provision."5 The instrument also may require
additional action from another branch or sub-branch of the
government. For example, Congress often must enact implementing
legislation to set penalties for treaty violations.f6 Another example is
that the House of Representatives must introduce appropriations
legislation to implement federal law requiring funding.f 7
However, not all legal instruments require additional law for
their execution. For example, many treaty and constitutional
provisions are self-executing.3  Whether a legal instrument is self-
executing turns on constitutional restraints, the language of the
particular instrument, 39 and/or the contemporaneous practice of the
Trinity: God, the Father; Jesus, the Son; and the Holy Spirit. It, too, creates a mystery of
faith: how can Jesus, the begotten of the Father, beget himself? See NICENE CREED at 1 2
(c. 325) ("We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, eternally begotten of
the Father, God from God.... begotten, not made, of one Being with the Father.").
234. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (ambiguous federal statute);
Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 232, at 713-15 (ambiguous treaties).
235. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing private cause of action for constitutional
violations committed by state authorities).
236. See, e.g., "War Crimes Act of 1996," 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (implementing penalty
legislation for Hague and Geneva Conventions).
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
238. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 402 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing
availability of damages relief for Fourths Amendment violations committed by federal
authorities); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (recognizing availability of injunctive
relief for Fifth Amendment violations committed by federal authorities); United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (United States-Spain treaty provision self-
executing).
239. The Vienna Convention states:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
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parties in the instrument's implementation. ° Use of the instrument's
legislative history may only be used as a supplemental means of
interpretation.24 ,
However, the execution doctrine becomes problematic when one
tries to apply it by using a separation of powers doctrine extrapolated
only from the text and structure of the Constitution. For example,
when one tries to determine whether treaty provisions are self-
executing or non-self-executing by appealing only to the text and
structure of the Constitution, a dilemma results. The same dilemma
results for customary international legal norms because treaties can
serve as evidence of extant customary international legal norms or
signal the acceptance of emerging customary international legal
norms. On the one hand, to allow the President with the Senate to
make self-executing federal law through their joint treaty making
authority under Article II sometimes can appear to circumvent and
usurp the House of Representative's essential role in lawmaking and
intrude upon areas of lawmaking that historically have been assigned
to both Houses under Article I. These areas include declaring war,
raising taxes, and imposing criminal penalties. Such a construction of
the treaty making power arguably violates the separation of powers
principle. On the other hand, to allow Congress to make self-
executing law that intrudes upon the President's and Senate's treaty
making power also violates the separation of powers doctrine.4 2
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
Vienna Convention, art. 31 (1)-(3).
240. Vienna Convention, art. 31 (3) (b) ("any subsequent practice in the application of
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation"). As
the Supreme Court stated in the context of constitutional construction:
The construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790, and the
act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its formation, many of
whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to
very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established
have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is almost
conclusive.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884).
241. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994);
HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 840-41 (4" ed.
1996).
242. A construction using the Necessary and Proper Clause does not solve this
dilemma. Congress may only enact legislation that is necessary and proper for executing
treaties, but what is "necessary and proper" depends on how one interprets the separation
of powers principle. If all treaties (regardless if their provisions are self-executing) require
implementing legislation in order to avoid a separation of powers conflict, then this
legislation is proper and necessary. On the other hand, if Congress cannot legislate in
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Examples of such usurpation could take the form of statutes violating
a previously ratified treaty or the form of statutes addressing any area
in which treaties could govern.243 Therefore, both constructions of the
separation of powers principle in relation to the self-execution or
non-self-execution of treaties founders on the horns of a dilemma
created by relying solely upon the text and structure of the
Constitution.2
Consider another related separation of powers dilemma. Take
the example of the Senate conditioning its consent to a treaty on the
acceptance of a reservation that certain treaty provisions are non-self-
executing.4 5 On the one hand, the Constitution makes no mention of
conditional consent. Either two-thirds of the Senate gives its consent
to a treaty, or it does not; therefore, such conditional consent
arguably could be a violation of the separation of powers principle."l
Furthermore, if the reservation requires a certain interpretation of
the treaty, the reservation arguably would run afoul of the judicial
branch's final authority to interpret federal law.247 If the Senate's
areas already covered by the treaties made under the authority of the President and
Senate, any legislation that attempts to usurp or circumvent these treaties violates the
separation of powers principle, and such legislation is neither necessary or proper.
243. One easily can imagine a vague federal trade statute that would require a trade
treaty to give the statute definition. Indeed, the Charming Betsy Rule requires that
federal statutes be construed in conformity with United States treaty obligations.
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
244. Even an appeal to democratic accountability and state equality as the underlying
justifications for the separation of powers principle does not get one off the horns of this
dilemma. Both a Presidential/Senatorial exclusive treaty-making power and an extension
of Congressional lawmaking power to international affairs are subject to democratic
accountability and state co-equality. Both constructions of the execution doctrine
incorporate state co-equality and at least different but roughly equal measures of
democratic accountability. The plenary treaty making power is checked by the state
equality in the Senate and by the people in a President elected by an electoral college
whose members are chosen according to the numbers of citizens in each state. The
extension of Congressional lawmaking power to international affairs is also checked by
state equality in the Senate as well as by the people in the House of Representatives
whose members are elected according to the numbers of citizens in each state. Therefore,
both Presidential/Senatorial and Congressional authorities have equal claims to reflecting
democratic accountability and state equality that do not resolve whose lawmaking
authority trumps the other.
245. See, e.g., U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4783-4 (daily ed.,
April 2, 1992) (declaring that substantive individual rights provisions in articles 1-27 of
ICCPR as non-self-executing).
246. Cf Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (Presidential line-item veto
held unconstitutional.)
247. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 -U.S. 507 (1997) (judicial branch has exclusive
final authority in interpreting Constitution).
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reservation requires the President to submit this reservation upon the
treaty's ratification, the Senate's reservation arguably would intrude
upon the President's ratification authority.
On the other hand, the Constitution is designed to ensure
efficient lawmaking. For example, the Constitution allows the Senate
to propose amendments to appropriations bills which do not originate
in the Senate but are still subject to the Senate's consent for becoming
law.248 This process is designed to avoid inefficiency resulting from
reintroduction of appropriations bills whose earlier versions did not
meet conditions for Senate approval. It would appear that the treaty
making process should also reflect such efficiency by allowing the
Senate to condition its consent to a treaty by way of submitting a
reservation to ensure that the treaty's implementation is consistent
with Senate intent. Hence, applying a separation of powers principle
based merely on the text and structure of the Constitution creates
constitutionally internal contradictions by both allowing and
disallowing the Senate to condition its consent through the
submission of reservations.
The solution to these constitutional conundrums is not to figure
out where one branch's power ends and another begins. As earlier
discussed, treaties and customary international law have superior
legal authority over federal statutory law, and therefore, the treaty-
making authority of the President and Senate must not be conceived
as being able to intrude upon the House's inferior lawmaking role.
Although international law often accommodates the separation of
powers principle, 9 the solution is to construe the Constitution in
conformity with the United States' modern customary international
law and treaty obligations.
In the case where a treaty (or customary international legal
norm) is being used to construe a constitutional provision that is itself
248. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
249. For example, the right to an impartial hearing under international human rights
law requires the functional independence - but not necessarily formal separation - of the
judiciary and political branches. Procola v. Luxembourg, 326 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1995); see also, A. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 35373/97, at § 77 (2002)
(parliamentary immunity enjoyed by Minister of Parliament pursued legitimate aims of
protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining separation of powers between
legislature and judiciary"). International law provides states a degree of deference
(known as the "margin of appreciation doctrine") in fashioning their domestic measures of
complying with their international legal obligations that is scaled according to, inter alia,
the amount of interference with the particular human right. See Laurence R. Heifer,
Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 133 (1993) (discussing margin of appreciation doctrine).
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self-executing in the sense that it does not need a federal statute to
provide a private cause of action, the issue of whether a treaty (or
customary international legal norm) is self-executing is moot because
it is not the treaty (or customary international legal norm) per se that
is being implemented. The constitutional provision already provides
a private cause of action, and the. treaty (or customary international
legal norm) is being used only for the provision's construction.
In the case of a constitutional provision that is non-self-executing
in the sense that it requires definition or does not provide a private
cause of action, the provision-can become implemented by construing
it in conformity with a treaty (or customary international legal norm).
After all, the notion of non-self-execution means that the legal
instrument requires action from a political branch of the government
for the instrument to be implemented, and in the case of a non-self-
executing constitutional provision, the.President and Senate can take
such action through their treaty-making authority.
In the case where a treaty (or customary international law)
addresses a substantive area to which the Constitution does not speak
(e.g., space exploration), the norm is self-executing unless legislation
is necessary for its execution. Such legislation could be that which
provides, e.g., needed clarification to the international law's
provisions, a private cause of action for ensuring the international
law's enforcement by persons whose rights have been violated, or
appropriations for the execution of the international law's provisions.
If such legislation arguably is necessary, then Congress is under as
much a constitutional duty to enact such legislation as it is under a
constitutional duty to execute other federal law - be it constitutional
or federal statutory law. Indeed, under the Object and Purpose Rule,
Congress' power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution" the treaty power, must be
construed in conformity with the Constitution's Preamble, and the
Preamble states that the Constitution's objects and purposes, inter
alia, are to "establish Justice, provide for the common defence, [and]
promote the general Welfare" - objects and purposes that often
require Congress to enact laws.25° If Congress fails to do so, then
there is a presumption that no legislation is needed, and the federal
courts have the constitutional obligation to apply the international
legal norm and - if a violation is found - fashion remedies. The
constitutional authority of a federal court to perform a United States
250. Vienna Convention, 31(1) (object and purpose rule); U.S. CONST. pmbl., art. I, § 8,
cl. 10, and art. I, § 9.
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international legal obligation is acquired by construing its statutory
jurisdictional grant in conformity with customary international law
guaranteeing judicial remedies per the Charming Betsy Rule.251  At
the very least, the performance of such international legal obligations
by federal courts would include a declaration that the United States
has failed to comply with its international legal obligations. Also, the
court must award monetary damages, the quantum of which would
depend on the measure of harm incurred by the victim. Further
relief, such as punitive damages, criminal prosecution, and other
injunctive relief, will depend on the factual circumstances of the case
and the limits of the United States' international legal obligations.
Even in cases where a treaty (or customary international law)
addresses a subject over which Congress has been given the specific
authority, e.g., under Article I, Section 8 to legislate (e.g., declaring
war, taxation, defining and punishing offenses against the law of
nations) or under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact implementing
legislation,252 there is no constitutional requirement for implementing
legislation - unless such legislation is necessary. If such legislation is
arguably necessary, then Congress is under a constitutional obligation
to enact proper legislation. Again, if Congress fails to do so, then
there is a presumption that no legislation is needed, and the federal
courts are free to apply the treaty (or customary international legal
norm) and fashion remedies. This conclusion even extends to cases in
which the House of Representatives has the exclusive authority to
introduce appropriations bills. If the House has failed to introduce
251. See infra note 257 (discussing customary international law guaranteeing effective
judicial remedies); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."); Murray v. the Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64, 118
(1804) (federal statutory law must be construed in conformity with customary
international law).
However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain noted in dicta
that federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 might not be available for
customary international law claims. - U.S. - n.19, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L. Ed. 2d 718 (2004)
(dicta). However, the Court failed to consider the Charming Betsy Rule's application to
such jurisdictional statutes that would provide a statutory construction requiring the
recognition of jurisdiction for individual claims. And, because other customary
international legal norms also must be used to construe the substantive constitutional
rights, individuals would have a private cause of action under those federal statutes (e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 1983) or judicial remedies (e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 402
U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing private cause of action for constitutional violations)) that
implement such constitutional rights.
252. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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appropriations necessary for the execution of the United States'
international law obligations, then a state or individual victim can sue
in federal court and obtain a money judgment against the United
States.
In the case of the proper reach of the, Senate's treaty making
authority in the context of conditional consents, the solution is to
conceptualize the Constitution as treaty, and as a treaty, the
Constitution becomes "amenable to the law of nations. '' 1 3 Customary
international law establishes that the conclusion of a treaty can be
invalidated by a party on the basis of error or fraud. Evidence of
such error or fraud could be established by an interpretive declaration
submitted by the President and/or Senate. Otherwise, the ordinary
meaning of the treaty's terms in their context and in light of the
treaty's object and purpose governs. However, if the interpretation
given by one of the state-parties to the treaty conflicts with the
ordinary meaning of the treaty or clearly violates the treaty's object
and purpose, the interpretation is just not valid. Hence, an
interpretive reservation made by the Senate (or President) that
conflicts with the meaning of the treaty or violates the treaty's object
and purpose is not valid.25 For example, if the reservation states that
a provision in a human rights treaty will not be self-executing by
providing a private cause of action, the reservation may not be valid 26
because states must provide individuals with an effective and
sufficient domestic judicial remedy under international human rights
law. 7 Although, generally speaking, international law often allows
253. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
254. Vienna Convention, arts. 48 (error) and 49 (fraud).
255. Vienna Convention, art. 19(c).
256. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("While courts interpret treaties
for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."). However, the
Supreme Court has rejected interpretations that clearly conflict with the language of the
treaty. Id. at 192 ("This Court has many times set its face against treaty interpretations
that unduly restrict rights a treaty is adopted to protect.").
257. International law generally requires that states provide full reparations, including
money damages and, if necessary, injunctive relief when they have committed an illegal
act. See Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (13 Sept.) (recognizing
restitutio in integrum principle). International human rights law guarantees that
individuals have a remedy enforceable in domestic courts. For example, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the
present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
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states to exercise a certain amount of discretion in fashioning how
they provide a domestic remedy for international legal violations,
international human rights tribunals have strictly limited this
deference and have required a judicial remedy because other
remedies (such as those provided by the political branches) are most
often ineffective and/or inadequate and a judicial remedy is the only
remedy that can provide complete restitution."' For example, in cases
where individuals have committed gross human rights violations,
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.
ICCPR, art. 2 (2)-(3); see UN Hum. Rts. Ctte., General Comment No. 24 (52), General
comment on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the
Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41
of the Covenant, §§ 3 and 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) (state-party
cannot make reservation denying remedy - including judicial remedy - for human rights
violations).
The American Convention on Human Rights states:
Article 25. RIGHT TO JUDICIAL PROTECTION.
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate
his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state
concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been
committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.
2. The States Parties undertake:
a. To ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights
determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of
the state;
b. To develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and
c. To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.
ACHR, art. 25. See MARTIN, CHALLENGING, supra note 9, at 77-78 (discussing
individual's right to remedy entails judicial remedy).
258. See, e.g., Anguelova v. Bulgaria, Application No. 38361/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. at § 161
(2002) (states allowed "some discretion" as to how they provide remedy to individuals for
international law violations); M.J. BOSsUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX
PRtPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 67 (1987); Darmburg v. Suriname, Case No. 10.117, Res. No. 19/89, Inter-Am.
Cm. H.R. 138, OEA/ser.L/V.II.76, doc. 10 (1988-89); Tumilovich v. Russia, Application
No. 47033, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999) (domestic remedy depending on discretionary powers do
not constitute effective domestic remedy).
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international human rights law creates an affirmative state duty to
punish such persons. 9 Only a judicial remedy could provide the
required punishment of individuals committing such human rights
violations. If the reservation violates extant customary international
law or jus cogens, then the reservation is invalid because the political
branches are violating the Constitution as construed according to
customary international law or jus cogens 60 .
Finally, another associated separation of powers principle is the
"political question" doctrine that states that the judicial branch
cannot examine a decision that is exclusively committed to the
political branches. The political question doctrine also is
controversial because it sometimes arguably gives the President
plenary authority when acting in his/her foreign capacity role that is
beyond the reach of both the Congress and the federal courts.
However, construing the Constitution in conformity with customary
international law can both maintain and restrain the President's
authority in international affairs in a determinate fashion. For
example in Goldwater v. Carter,26' three members of the Supreme
Court's majority based their dismissal of a challenge to President
Carter's unilateral termination of United States-Taiwan defense
treaty on political question grounds (and one member based the
dismissal on grounds that the suit was not ripe).
However (putting aside the issue of ripeness), the Court could
have addressed the merits because international law allows states
unilaterally to terminate or suspend treaties when a fundamental
259. See, e.g., Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ser. C., No. 4 at
172 (1988) (state affirmative duty to punish rights to life and humane treatment); Celis
Laureano v. Peru, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC561D/540/1993 (1996) (views adopted March 25,
1996) (state affirmative duty to punish violations of rights to life, humane treatment, and
liberty and personal security committed by state and non-state actors).
260. See supra notes 201-203. However, a reservation's invalidity does not abrogate
the United States' customary international legal obligations under the treaty if the United
States already effectively has acquiesced to the treaty's norms through, e.g., its signature to
the treaty. A way in which a state arguably could lawfully make a reservation to a
customary international legal norm in a treaty is if the treaty creates an enforcement organ
and if the reservation is interpreted to mean only that the state-party does not recognize
the organ's competence to interpret the norm in regard to claims against the state-party.
See UN Hum. Rts. Ctte., General Comment No. 24 (52), General comment on issues
relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the
Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant,
§ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994) ("The principle of inter-State reciprocity
has no place, save perhaps in the limited context of reservations to declarations on the
Committee's competence" to consider inter-state complaints.); Belilos v. Switzerland, 10
E.H.R.R. 466 (1988) (de Meyer, J., concurring).
261. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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change of circumstances has taken place,262 and such a fundamental
change of circumstances had taken place when the United States and
the UN recognized the Peoples' Republic of China (and not Taiwan)
as the legitimate government of China. Taiwan was no longer
recognized as a sovereign state that lawfully could exercise self-
defense under UN Charter 263 against invasion by the Peoples'
Republic of China. The United States-Taiwan mutual defense treaty,
however, required both parties to "maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity to. resist armed attack and
communist subversive activities directed from without against their
territorial integrity and political stability."264 This was inconsistent
with the Peoples' Republic of China's legitimate claims over Taiwan.
Hence, the United States-Taiwan treaty was no longer valid.
However, the separation of powers principle upon which the
political question doctrine is based, cuts both ways. The separation of
powers doctrine prohibited President Carter from terminating the
treaty because it would have intruded upon the Senate's role in
making the treaty and the Constitution does not expressly say that a
President can terminate a treaty. On the other hand, the President's
foreign affairs authority under the Constitution would have allowed
him to withdraw state recognition of Taiwan and the consequent
nullification of the treaty.
2 5
Again, the solution is to construe the Constitution (specifically,
the President's foreign affairs authority) in conformity with
customary international law. President Carter constitutionally could
have terminated the treaty because he properly would have been
"faithfully" executing federal law by terminating a treaty that was no
longer lawful under the United States' treaty and customary
international legal obligations. 266 He would not have been exercising
some vague foreign affairs authority that was judicially extracted from
the political question doctrine that cuts both ways.
In conclusion, ILC allows us to do an "end-run" around these
execution and political question dilemmas. This interpretive move
262. Vienna Convention, art. 62.
263. UN Charter, art. 51.
264. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic
of China, Dec. 2, 1954, art. II, T.I.A.S. 3178; 6 U.S.T. 433-438 (entered into force Mar. 3,
1955).
265. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
266. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (duty to "faithfully execute the Office of the
President").
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releases us from the internally contradictory constraints of a
separation of powers principle that relies solely upon the
Constitution's text and structure. First, the claim that treaties (or
customary international law) are unenforceable in United States
courts absent an express statement to the contrary or implementing
legislation267 is effectively mooted because the determination of
whether such treaties (or customary international law) are
enforceable is not exclusively tied to the Constitution's ambiguous
text and structure but also is tied to customary international law - the
appropriate source of law for construing Constitution as a treaty. In
the case of treaties requiring an express statement that the treaty is
self-executing, such a statement is effectively not required when
customary international law (as reflected in treaties or judicial
decisions construing such treaties) already speaks to the matter 6.2  In
cases where constitutional text is being construed with a treaty (or
customary international law), implementing legislation is not
required. It is not legally relevant if the treaty (or customary
international law) requires implementing law (for it to be enforced by
United States courts) in order for the treaty (or customary
international law) to, in turn, be used to construe the Constitution's
text. Such treaty law (or customary international law) is not being
implemented per se.269 The relevant issue is whether the particular
267. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 21; Yoo, Rejoinder, supra note 21.
268. Cf Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 526-28 (1951) (no Act of Congress
required to guide enforcement of treaty provisions because judicial decisions provided
sufficient definition to treaty provisions).
269. Indeed, under customary international law governing treaties, courts sometimes
can construe a treaty in conformity with other treaties that do not share any states-parties
with the treaty being construed and, hence, do not constitute binding law for a party to the
treaty being construed. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (1971) ("an international
instrument must be interpreted and applied within the overall framework of the
[international] juridical system in force" (emphasis provided)); Interpretation of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article
64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 10, at T 37 (1989) (same). The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has recognized that even non-Inter-American treaties properly can be used to
complement and construe Inter-American treaties.
The need of the regional system to be complemented by the universal finds
expression in the practice of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and is entirely consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention, the
American Declaration and the Statute of the Commission. The Commission has
properly invoked in some of its reports and resolutions "other treaties
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states," regardless of
their bilateral or multilateral character, or whether they have been adopted
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Constitutional provision itself is self-executing. For some
constitutional provisions, no implementing legislation is required, e.g.,
to provide definition to the provision, a private cause of action for its
violation, or some other-action constitutionally addressed to another
branch of the federal government. For example, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the human rights guarantees contained
in the first eight Amendments to the Constitution are self-executing
in the sense of not. constitutionally requiring a private cause of
action.270 Accordingly, these constitutional rights - even if construed
according to treaty or customary international legal norms - still are
self-executing. Even in cases where constitutional provisions require
implementing legislation to provide definition, such provisions do not
need such implementing legislation if they have been construed in
light of a treaty (or customary international law or any other extra-
constitutional authority). The issue of whether the constitutional
provision is self-executing or not is made moot by this international
legal construction. In cases where Congress has arguably failed to
fulfill its constitutional duty, as construed by the Object and Purpose
Rule, to provide necessary implementing legislation for a treaty (or
customary international legal norm), federal courts are free to apply
the treaty (or customary international, legal norm) and fashion
remedies.
Second, this approach also does an end-run around the political
question doctrine when the President acts in his foreign affairs
capacity. Without conceptualizing the Constitution as a treaty, the
President is restrained only if the federal courts believe that a case is
not justiciable (on the basis, e.g., of the political question doctrine)
and only if the federal courts have text in the Constitution to
interpret.271 However, the Constitution as a treaty moots these issues
within the framework or under the auspices of the inter-American system.
"Other Treaties" Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of the
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) No. 1, at § 43(1982).
270. See City of Bourne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) ("first eight Amendments to
the Constitution set forth self executing prohibitions on governmental action"); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 402 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing private cause of action for
Fourth Amendment violations); Boiling, v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (recognizing
private right to injunctive relief for Fifth Amendment violations).
271. This approach also places greater constitutional restraints on Congress when
Congress exercises its plenary legislative powers in, e.g., the area of immigration.
International law places limits on a state's plenary power to control its borders. See, e.g.,
Protocol I Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into
force Oct. 4, 1967).
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because the President's foreign affairs authority per the Constitution
as a treaty must be construed in conformity with this international law
governing treaties that transcends the Constitution. Hence, the
trinitarian mystery of the separation of powers is transcended.
5.3 Federalism as Koan
Another general principle of constitutional construction is the
principle of federalism that recognizes that both the federal and state
272governments are limited under the Constitution. However,
construing the Constitution according to the principle of federalism is
like the Zen koan of asking "what is the sound of one hand
clapping?" The Ninth and Tenth Amendments do not list which
powers and rights are retained and reserved respectively by the states
and people. Conversely, the State Commerce, Taxation, and
Spending Clauses often do not sufficiently detail how far Congress
can reach into state matters when it exercises its lawmaking authority
under Article I, Section 9.
For example, in 1976, the Supreme Court in National League of
Cities v. Usery27 in a 5-4 decision held that the application of the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to state employees violated the Tenth Amendment and exceeded
Congress' authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause by
intruding into "areas of traditional [state] governmental functions."
However, the Court did not provide a principled analysis of which
state governmental functions are traditional. As the Supreme Court
would later say in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,
Our examination of this 'function' standard applied in these and
other cases over the last eight years now persuades us that the
attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in
272. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting certain Congressional acts) and art. I, § 10
(prohibiting certain state acts), and amends. XIX ("The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."), X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."),
and XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 321 (1819) ("We admit, as all must admit,
that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be
transcended.").
273. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
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terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not only
unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles
of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles
on which National League of Cities purported to rest.
2
7
Nine years later, the Supreme Court again in a 5-4 decision
overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.275 The Garcia Court articulated a new
test for establishing state governmental immunity from federal
legislation by looking to the "procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system [rather] than by judicially created
limitations on federal power., 276 However, like the National League
of Cities Court, the Garcia Court did not provide a principled
analysis.
Nine years later again, the Supreme Court again in a 5-4 decision
in United States v. Lopez held that Congress exceeded its authority
under the Interstate Commerce Clause by making it a federal offense
to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school. The activity
outlawed by the relevant provisions of the federal statute did not have
a "substantial relation to interstate commerce,... i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce., 271 Possessing a firearm
within 1000 feet of a school had nothing to do with commerce or any
economic enterprise. However, exactly what is "substantial" will be
left to judicial tinkering on a case-by-case basis that is particularly
susceptible to the personal political or social whims of the individual
justices. Indeed, the Lopez Court arguably conceded this when it said
that its principles were "not precise formulations.,
27 9
In United States v. Morrison,2" the Supreme Court in another 5-4
decision held that the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA)28' unconstitutionally exceeded
Congress' authority under both the Interstate Commerce Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment. The provision stated that "[a]ll persons
within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of
274. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 532 (1976).
275. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
276. Id. at 552.
277. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995) (dissenting opinion does
not provide principled exclusion of federal intrusion upon state activities).
278. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
279. Id. at 567.
280. 529 U.S. 598 (2001).
281. 108 Stat. 1941-1942, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
Spring 2004] OUR CONSTITUTION As FEDERAL TREATY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
violence motivated by gender." To enforce that right, the statute
declared:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State)
who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus
deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this
section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate.
The Supreme Court held that the provision exceeded
Congressional authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause
because the non-economic behavior addressed by the provision had
only an "aggregate effect on interstate commerce." The provision
also exceeded Congressional authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the provision also applied to violations
perpetrated by non-state actors to which the Fourteenth Amendment
purportedly does not apply. 85
If the text and structure of the Constitution alone is insufficient
for determining a case outcome that is not susceptible to judicial
predilections and judge-made law, then one needs to go outside the
text and structure, and construe our constitutional treaty in
conformity with an authority that is less susceptible to these
criticisms. Such an authority is modern customary international law.
At the outset, it is important to note that international law often
accommodates domestic federalism restraints. For example, the
American Convention on Human Rights states:
1. Where a State Party is constituted as a federal state, the
national government of such State Party shall implement all the
provisions of the Convention over whose subject matter it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction.
2. With respect to the provisions over whose subject matter the
constituent units of the federal state have jurisdiction, the
national government shall immediately take suitable measures,
in accordance with its constitution and its laws, to the end that
the competent authorities of the constituent units may adopt
282. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
284. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617.
285. Id. at 621.
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appropriate provisions for the fulfillment of this Convention.286
Also, the State Commerce Clause at issue in the above cases sits
between the Foreign Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses,
which address types of commerce that have been governed by
international law.21 It is only appropriate that the law of nations
should govern the proper construction of the Commerce Clause as a
whole if coherence has any constructional value.
Furthermore, the State Commerce Clause does not strictly refer
only to commerce "between" states. It refers to commerce "among
the several States."2 It is misleading to call the State Commerce
Clause the "Interstate Commerce Clause" because the Clause does
not deal only with "inter"-state commerce. The Clause does not
strictly refer only to commerce "between" states. It refers to
commerce "among the several States," which indicates that it also
includes only intrastate commerce. The use of the word "among"
allows for the inclusion of commercial activities within a state.
Congress constitutionally can make laws that are necessary "for the
purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government. '' 290 One such general power is to execute treaty and
customary international legal norms. Therefore, if the conduct of
commerce that exclusively takes place within a state interferes with
286. ACHR, art. 28 (2)-(3). The United States has signed the ACHR, thereby
indicating the United States' acceptance of any regional customary international legal
norms reflected therein. See FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW & PRACTICE: CASES, TREATIES AND MATERIALS
(DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT) xvii (1997) (library edition).
Although the "may adopt" language of Article 28 (3) suggests that constituent units
within a federal state retain a degree of discretion in choosing whether or not to "adopt
appropriate provisions," the Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution explicitly
eliminates this discretionary authority insofar as United States treaty obligations are
concerned.
287. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902) (international law governs
relations between states); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1124 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) (trade
treaty); Treaty with Arikara Tribe, July 18, 1825, 7 Stat., 259, in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS
AND TREATIES, compiled and edited by Charles J. Kappler (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1904) (treaty governing commerce with Indians); but see 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1988) (prohibiting making of treaties with Indians after 1871).
288. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
289. Also, compare the language of the Foreign Commerce Clause and its use of the
word "with" (as opposed to "among"). The United States cannot regulate commerce
"among" foreign nations - only "with" foreign nations.
290. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
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the compliance of the United States' treaty or customary
international legal norms, then Congress can enact implementing
legislation to regulate this exclusively intrastate commerce on the
basis of the State Commerce Clause if it is construed in conformity
with the United States' treaty or customary international legal
obligations.
However, the more direct route would be to justify the federal
legislation as implementing legislation pursuant to Congress' treaty
authority and authority to define and punish offenses against the law
of nations. Indeed, this approach is a necessary corollary of the
Supreme Court's Charming Betsy Rule that requires federal statutes
to be construed in conformity with the United States' international
legal obligations. If there is a relevant international legal norm
binding on the United States with which a federal statute can be
construed, then the federal statute does not violate the principle of
federalism because Congress was exercising its constitutional
authority to enact legislation implementing international legal
obligations that the United States had accepted through its exercise of
the Article II treaty and Article I "define and punish" clauses.
Consider the aforementioned problematic federalism cases. In
National League of Cities and Garcia in which employees' rights were
at stake, international law creates affirmative state duties in ensuring
protection of workers' rights and, accordingly, the appropriate
outcome in these cases would have been one protective of such
workers' rights. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights guarantees that "[e]veryone who works has the right to just
and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an
existence worthy of human dignity."'29' The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees "fair wages" and a
"decent living."2" In enacting minimum and overtime wage
291. UDHR, art. 23(3). Although the UDHR arguably may not be self-executing in
United States courts, the United States has recognized that it does reflect its customary
international legal obligations because the it was adopted unanimously by the UN General
Assembly (including the U.S.) and has been recognized as reflecting United States
customary international legal obligations by the federal courts. See Sei Fuji v. State, 38
Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (UDHR is non-self-executing); Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (UDHR reflects customary international law).
292. Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7(a), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976)
[hereinafter ICESCR]. Over 130 states are parties to the ICESCR, providing strong
evidence of its customary international legal status. The United States also has signed the
ICESCR, thereby indicating the United States' acceptance of any global customary
international legal norms reflected therein. See Multilateral Treaties on Deposit with the
Secretary General, (as of 30 Dec. 1999), available at
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legislation, Congress constitutionally could have relied jointly upon
both an international legal construction of the State Commerce
Clause and its authority to define offenses against the law of nations,
namely, the failure to provide fair and favourable wages and a decent
living.293
In the case of a federal statute criminalizing the possession of
firearms near schools, such as Lopez, the statute would be a
constitutional exercise of Congress' authority to define and punish
violations of the law of nations. Under international human rights
law, states have an affirmative duty not only to prevent foreseeable
violations of the rights to life and humane treatment perpetrated by
private persons but also to punish such violations."4 International
human rights law also provides special protection to children.9
<http://untreaty.un.org/English/sample/EnglishnternetBibe/part/chapterIV/treaty4.asp>
(last visited 23 Aug. 2003).
293. Widely adopted multilateral treaties, such as the ICESR (and the customary
international law that they reflect), must be construed liberally. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133
U.S. 258, 271 (1890) ("It is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that
they shall be liberally construed so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to
secure equality and reciprocity between them."). Therefore, minimum wage and overtime
legislation that implements the ICESR, which does not expressly mention minimum and
overtime wage requirements, still would be an appropriate Congressional exercise of its
legislative authority.
294. Under this customary international law, both federal and state governments have
affirmative duties to prevent foreseeable homicides - even if committed by non-state
actors. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in a case concerning the
right to life stated the following:
The.. obligation of the States Parties is to "ensure" the free and full exercise of
the rights recognized by the [ACHR] to every person subject to its jurisdiction.
This obligation implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public
power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and
full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation, the States
must prevent.. .any violation of the rights recognized by the [ACHR]....
VelAsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, at 166 (1988)
(emphasis provided); see also Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 E.H.R.R. 245 (2000)
(affirmative state duty to prevent foreseeable right to life violations committed by private
actor); Baustista de Arellana v. Colombia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/1993 (1995) (views
adopted 27 Oct. 1995) (state affirmative duty to punish violation of right to life); cf. Kadic
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996) (international
human rights law creates duties for non-state actors).
295. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 Nov. 1989, art. 6 (2), G.A.
res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989)
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) ("States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent
possible the survival and development of the child."). The United States is a signatory to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Multilateral Treaties on Deposit with the
Secretary General, (as of 30 Dec. 1999), available at
<http://untreaty.un.org/English/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partl/chapterIV/treatyl5.asp
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Therefore, a federal statute criminalizing the possession of firearms
near a school would be proper and necessary for preventing
foreseeable death and injury to children as guaranteed by the United
States' customary international legal obligations.
In Morrison, the remedial provision of VAWA would have been
found constitutional if the Fourteenth Amendment had been
construed in conformity with the United States' customary
international human rights legal obligations. International human
rights law creates an affirmative state duty to provide a domestic
judicial remedy296 for gender based violence2" even if committed by
private individuals!" Therefore, construing the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee in conformity with this
international human rights law would have resulted in a different
outcome in Morrison, an outcome upholding the remedial provision
of VAWA. 99
> (last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
296. See supra note 257.
297. See Rivas Quintanilla v. El Salvador, Case 10.772, Report No. 6/94, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1993,
OEA/Ser.L/V/I.85 Doc. 9 rev. at 181 (1994) (state violated right to right to humane
treatment by failing to investigate sexual assault on girl by state actor).
298. See X & Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985) (state violated
right to privacy for failing to investigate sexual assault against female allegedly committed
by non-state actor). Although the European Court of Human Rights' decision in X & Y v.
The Netherlands was founded on a right to privacy (which generally does not necessarily
entail state affirmative duties), sexual assaults also implicate jus cogens violations, namely,
gender discrimination and inhumane treatment. See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 4(2) (rights against
sex discrimination and inhumane treatment are non-derogable). Under international
human rights and humanitarian law, jus cogens norms always require state affirmative
duties to prevent, investigate, and punish their violations as well as to provide
compensation when the state fails to do so. See, e.g., VelAsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ser. C., No. 4 at 1 172 (1988) (state affirmative duty to prevent,
investigate, and punish rights to life and humane treatment, and to provide compensation
for state failure to do so); Celis Laureano v. Peru, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993
(1996) (views adopted 25 March 1996) (state affirmative duty to investigate and punish
violations of rights to life, humane treatment, and liberty and personal security committed
by state and non-state actors, and to provide compensation for failure to do so).
299. Another federalism principle is the anti-commandeering doctrine. See, e.g., Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (interim provisions of Brady Handgun Violence
Protection Act requiring state and local police to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers in order to prevent unlawful possession of handguns by
convicted felons or fugitives from justice held violative of Tenth Amendment). Preventive
crime control laws - such as that at issue in Printz - could have been found a constitutional
exercise of Congress' Article 1, Section 8 authority to enact legislation necessary for
punishing offenses against the law of nations that include violations of the right to life
under the United States' customary international legal obligations. See supra notes 259
and 294. Congress constitutionally could have required state governments to conduct
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This approach of recognizing the Constitution as a federal treaty
does an end-run around the argument that the State Commerce
Clause cannot reach activities that have no substantial affect on
interstate commerce because this approach construes the State
Commerce Clause within the complete international legal context of
the Commerce Clause and, accordingly, in conformity with customary
international law that may require implementing legislation. This
approach also does an end run around the argument that customary
international legal norms are unenforceable in United States courts
absent an express statement to the contrary or implementing
legislation3°° because the issue is mooted by federal law implementing
these norms.
Furthermore, such an approach is congruous with another
federalist guarantee in the Constitution: the Ninth Amendment. A
Ninth Amendment construction in conformity with the law of nations
provides an enumeration of fundamental rights "retained by the
people," including the rights to fair and favorable wages, and a decent
living. Federal law implementing such customary international legal
rights ensures that such rights are recognized as Ninth Amendment
rights?°1
In conclusion, this customary international legal approach
transcends the koan of federalism. Because the American people's
plenary power (as recognized by the Constitution's Preamble and
Tenth Amendment) both encompasses and underlies the
constitutionally derivative claims to power by the federal and state
governments, this plenary popular power in all fields of governmental
regulation displaces the narrowly defined dynamic of competing
federal and state governmental claims to exclusive authority in
particular fields. No longer should the Tenth Amendment's threshold
question be whether the federal or state government is overreaching
its respective powers. 'Instead, the issue of whether the Tenth
Amendment is being violated turns on whether either the federal or
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers in order to prevent the unlawful
possession of handguns by convicted felons and fugitives who foreseeably would commit
homicides. Customary international law allows intergovernmental bodies lawfully
exercising their authority under their constitutive treaties to "commandeer" state
authorities in order to ensure state compliance with their international legal obligations.
The UN Security Council repeatedly has done so in implementing the UN Charter.
300. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Common Law, supra note 21 (arguing that
customary international law is merely federal common law unenforceable in United States
courts).
301. Cf United States v. Spencer, 160 F.3d 413 (7th. Cir. 1998) (rights must not violate
federal law to be guaranteed by Ninth Amendment).
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state government is breaching the powers reserved to the American
people. To determine whether the American people's authority is
being unconstitutionally undermined turns on whether their Ninth
Amendment rights (including those recognized by international law)
are being violated. As Ninth Amendment rights, these rights are
enforceable in American courts.3" By conceptualizing federalism in
terms of the Preamble's and Tenth Amendment's recognition of
American popular sovereignty, the principle of federalism restrains
both federal and state governments when Ninth Amendment rights
are enforced. The answer to the koan of federalism is not discovered
by trying to figure out what is the sound of one hand of authority
clapping, where federal power ends and state power begins. The
answer is the sound of the body's pulse, the American body politic's
sinews contracting in the performance of its international legal
obligations.
6. The Constitutional Challenges Posed by Globalization
Like it or not, globalization is here to stay. National frontiers
have been effectively eroded by the internet and other global
telecommunications systems. States have become increasingly
interdependent for maintaining international peace and security
resulting in the multiplication of multilateral approaches to global
problems, such as terrorism, world hunger, nuclear weapons
proliferation, the AIDS pandemic, regional ethnic and religious
conflicts, and global warming."3 The constitutional challenge is how
to ensure the American people's rights are not eroded by these
globalizing forces because our Constitution is primarily designed to
protect American interests. However, the solution is not to isolate
constitutional construction from international law. That approach is
not only unrealistic given the momentum of these globalizing forces,
it is also a disservice to the American people because many of these
302. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy
enforceable in federal court); In re Sherol, 581 P.2d 884 (Okla. 1978) (Ninth Amendment
right to respect for family integrity enforceable in state court); Voichahoske v. City of
Grand Island, 194 Neb. 175 (1975) (Ninth Amendment right to marry enforceable in state
court).
303. Just a few illustrations of such multilateral approaches in these areas include
programs and operations undertaken by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (UN
FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP), UN
Environment Programme, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and UN
Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
[Vol. 31:3
forces increasingly bestow transnational benefits on the American
people. The observance of international legal norms can minimalize
any deleterious effects of globalization because international law, by
definition, places restraints on international activities. Even if specific
international legal norms seemingly legitimate globalization forces
that are harmful to the American people, international law itself can
provide the means of invalidating these bad norms because
international law creates a hierarchy of norms with human rights
taking primacy over other norms.3"
Conclusion: Transubstantiating the Constitution into Treaty
The Constitution's success as a constitutive legal instrument for
maintaining the unification of the states while confirming the legality
of the new federal government through the American people is to be
attributed to its nature as a treaty. Only by means of a treaty could
the states remain states. Only by a treaty could the federal
government of the Articles of Confederation legally have been
replaced by a new federal government. Only as a treaty governed by
international law recognizing the original locus of sovereignty
residing in the people could the Constitution legally preclude the
possibility that the replacement of the Articles was illegal. But most
importantly, recognizing the Constitution as a treaty will enable the
United States to adapt to a New World challenged by the forces of
globalization, prominent among these being the internationalization
of legal norms. And, only by recognizing the Constitution as a treaty
can we be assured that the Constitution will always demand
compliance with these norms because as a treaty, the Constitution
primarily must be construed with customary international law.
However, customary international law will not always provide an
answer to many mysteries of constitutional faith. In those situations,
we will have to continue allowing courts to use extra-constitutional
authorities in order to construe the Constitution according to the
principles that they have and will develop on a case-by-case manner
and extrapolated from the Constitution's text and structure. New
mysteries of constitutional faith, no doubt, will reveal themselves, and
new theories of constitutional interpretation will emerge.
Nevertheless, ILC provides some important practical,
methodological, and systemic advantages. First, ILC provides a
mandatory interpretive method that is deduced from the
304. See supra text accompanying notes 201-204.
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Constitution's text - in both senses of language and legal instrument.
Second, ILC provides better definitional limits on the powers of the
President and Congress in their foreign affairs and domestic
capacities, and on the federal judiciary's lawmaking, while at the same
time securing the fundamental rights of the American people. Third,
ILC provides the advantage of integrating international law into the
overall constitutional legal scheme in a more internally and externally
consistent manner as well as resolving many of the internal
contradictions that result from construing the Constitution only
according to its text and structure.
We can transcend many mysteries of constitutional faith and
recover the Constitution's transubstantial essence as treaty if we view
the Constitution from an international legal perspective" and if we
release ourselves from the constraints of an American exceptionalism
that jingoistically views international law with moral incredulity.
However, to release ourselves may require a leap of faith - believing
that peoples in other countries share our values - that they, too,
believe in the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
305. International perspectives on the Constitution previously have provided
important, previously unrecognized constitutional insights. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE
TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1831) (French political theorist recognizing
Constitution's success as based on its system of checks and balances).
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